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**Lesson Learned Review of SLGP's Support to Solid Waste
Management IBPs**

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Acronyms/Abbreviations

AEPB	Abuja Environmental Protection Board
BENSESA	Benue State Environmental and Sanitation Authority
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development
DoC	Drivers of Change
ENSEPA	Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency
ESWAMA	Enugu State Waste Management Authority
FCTA	Federal Capital Territories Authority
IBPs	Issue Based Projects
IWTF	Integrated Waste Treatment Facility
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisation
PFM	Public Financial Management
SDIPs	Service Delivery Improvement Projects
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SLGP	State and Local Government Programme
SWM	Solid Waste Management



1.0 SUMMARY

During the final year of the work of the State and Local Government Programme a series of review, lesson learning and dissemination activities have been planned to ensure that lessons are identified, reflected on, shared and finally etched into the institutional memory of all those working on similar reforms in Nigeria.

This report collates experience with conducting the fifth in the cycle of short reviews to capture and learn from the different arenas in which SLGP has been conducting its work.

The report looks at SLGP's support to solid waste management (SWM) in two State contexts - Enugu and Benue, and one federal context - the Federal Capital Territories Authority (FCTA). Section 2 elaborates on the general historical context, the nature of what constitutes an 'Issues Based Project', the environment in which the work was conducted and describes the methods used to capture lessons.

Section 3 reflects on SLGP's experience in supporting SWM and explains the different approaches taken in different state contexts and the federal arena, and draws out specific lessons.

1.1 Solid Waste Management

- Reform of solid waste management represents a logical entry point to wider institutional change if it is done as a systematic change process addressing all the issues behind a dysfunctional and corrupt government agency. It therefore cannot be seen as a 'quick win'
- The sustained success of such a process in a government agency is dependent upon the combination of political and bureaucratic commitment, with strong leadership of the agency itself to ensure that the changes lead to increased benefits in service provision
- The roles and responsibilities of the State Government and the donor need to be clearly delineated before the project starts in order to provide the required base for negotiation should either party's commitment waver
- None of the three case studies here presented had an existing 'coalition for change' in support of the initiative at the outset. These coalitions may be built through the lifetime of the project (and beyond) if civil society groups are drawn into the process (media, NGOs and critically CBOs)
- The models for public-private partnership in solid waste are various for solid waste management, and careful consideration must be given to what is most appropriate in any given State. Revenue collection for services is a difficult issue to manage, particularly when there is a strong culture of tax evasion, and when the services being provided are negatively affected by nascent and fragile relationships between government as regulator and private sector as provider



The generic lessons for those wanting to engage with the SWM reform process in Nigeria are laid out in Section 4, with particular reference to the lessons for State Governments, and for the donors. At a State Government level, these relate to issues regarding the need for leadership and commitment, managing change processes effectively, working with civil society and drawing upon a donor's support to best effect.

For donors there are a number of additional lessons about how and with whom to engage, and how to view a theme such as solid waste management in terms of leading into wider systemic change.

2.0 INTRODUCTION TO SLGP AND THE PURPOSE OF THE LLR

Since the State and Local Government Programme (SLGP) was initiated in November 2000 it has worked in a total of six states and at Federal level with a number of Federal Ministries and Agencies. The work has covered a wide range of activities leading to varying degrees of success over the years. A large body of evidence now exists in the field about both the successes and the failures. At this point the programme has just over one year to run before a successor, DFID-funded, governance programme commences. It is important that this or any other new governance programme, designed by donors and Nigerian stakeholders, is able to build on the lessons learned by SLGP.

Various state governments and federal agencies have shown an appetite for reform. It is vital that information on SLGP's reform initiatives can be made available to them in an accessible form. Unlike when SLGP started, there are now numerous donor funded initiatives in governance, each of these streams of work would benefit from understanding what worked for SLGP (and what did not) and equally importantly, understanding why some approaches worked better than others in particular contexts.

For these reasons SLGP has initiated a programme of lesson learning and dissemination. The cycle of studies covers the main areas of SLGP's support work in different aspects of governance in Nigeria: policy and strategy, Public Financial Management (PFM), civil service reform and improved service delivery, communication and transparency and work around issue based projects (IBPs)¹. This report focuses on lessons deriving from SLGP's support for solid waste management as one set of the issue based projects (the other set relates to water and will be the subject of a separate review). It will examine the experience of supporting three processes in two State contexts (Enugu and Benue) and one federal context (the Federal Capital Territory Administration – FCTA).

¹ Issue based projects (IBPs) provided funds for pursuing particular initiatives geared to longer-term sustainable system reform of government where it was felt that there was sufficient local popular demand to push for change and to work in innovative ways with government to improve service delivery (e.g. with water services in Kano).



The reform processes being considered here were developed in the context of an international development community pressing through donor agencies for progress in improving Nigeria's progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Nigeria. The thrust of this international effort has broadly been to improve the Government of Nigeria's capacity to support poverty reduction, through managing effective macro-economic stability, promoting non-oil growth, improved governance and service delivery in a sustainable way at Federal, State and Local Government levels. In recent years, the current administration has shown that it is more reform oriented, by supporting good governance measures at the federal level. As a result of a whole suite of reform activity, the international community has provided debt relief to speed development outcomes and indicated its willingness to provide more aid. DFID espoused a three pronged approach to Nigerian reform in its Country Assistance Plan of 2004-08; the first to focus on NEEDS and SEEDS, the second to support an 'issues-based approach', and the third to support a range of programmes explicitly aimed at MDGs related to health and education. The three approaches were conceived as mutually reinforcing and complementary.

SLGP has included elements of support to the solid waste management theme within the issues-based approach in two of its partner states and the FCTA (as part of federal government). All of the initiatives in this thematic area fall under the overall SLGP programme output 7 "*Issues Based Projects*".

2.1 Approach taken to this lesson learning review

The LLR team consisted of a Nigerian consultant and an international consultant, supported by the SLGP Lesson Learning and Dissemination Officer. The consultants conducted a review of relevant documents, as presented in Annex 2. The team then conducted a series of interviews with key individuals and focus groups, composed largely of civil servants, in one State setting (Enugu), and one Federal setting (FCTA), as shown in Annex 3. The Benue case study was based on the experience of the Nigerian consultant, who had been involved in the process, and literature review. Further interviews were held with SLGP staff in each context (and for Benue ex-staff and consultants were consulted by email), and financial information was drawn from the financial records of the programme to complete the case studies. All three case studies are collated in Annex 1.



3.0 THE CONTEXT FOR SUPPORTING ISSUES-BASED PROJECTS

3.1 The theory of Issue Based Projects (IBPs) in Nigeria

The idea of IBPs was based on a particular concept about how change occurs. In Nigeria in 2003 donor assumptions were being challenged about the degree of political will for reform following Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, and the relevance of capacity building alone as a means for driving pro-poor change². The issues-based approach starts with an analysis of the political economy surrounding the institutional changes that reformers are attempting to achieve, and the identification of key issues that will motivate a critical mass of support for reform. There are two features of an IBP:

- Interventions are based on an analysis of the strategic importance of an issue, its link to institutional reform, and its impact on poverty reduction
- Issues must be Nigerian-led, have an established Nigerian constituency demanding reform, and wherever possible, be linked to the government's own reform agenda. DFID can then add value by supporting these coalitions (with financial and technical assistance) to achieve the outcome³

The IBP theory is that change happens when broad coalitions of different agents in society come together around issues of common interest. These issues-based coalitions have more potential to bring about change in institutions than capacity building alone. The Nigeria Drivers of Change (DoC) study identified that these institutions, rather than capacity per se, constituted the key constraint to the achievement of the MDGs in Nigeria, and IBPs were seen as a donor intervention that could best support such coalitions to come together and drive reform. IBPs were also a response to SLGP's experience in its partner states between 2001 and 2003. Initial engagement with new partner states took a long time, and SLGP made little early headway in its attempts to start a dialogue with partners on 'reform'. IBPs offered a way to make reform tangible.

3.2 The SWM Projects – IBPs?

In relation to the SLGP interventions in solid waste management, the two of the three interventions are better described as Service Delivery Improvement Pilots (SDIPs) in relation to the early IBP definition. The first two so-called IBPs (SWM in Benue and Enugu) were SLGP initiatives that predated the IBP conceptual construct (starting in September 2002 and January 2003 respectively). They were adopted as a means to engage with State Government, by focusing dialogue around a visible service that the State Government wanted to improve. All three of the initiatives analysed here were used as a means to demonstrate service delivery improvement through organisational reform; but none of them were based on an existing Nigerian constituency demanding reform.

² Joint Inception Review 2003, Drivers of Change study in Nigeria 2003.

³ Where Capacity is not the Only Problem. Moving from generic capacity building to support for issues-based change in Nigeria. Christopher Pycroft & Richard Butterworth, September 2005. Capacity Development Briefs, Number 12. World Bank Institute.



By October 2003, when the Inception Review of SLGP took place, it was clear that the Enugu pilot on solid waste management was providing a “useful basis for the issue based reform approach”. The shift in language from service delivery improvement pilot to issue based project is important in terms of the explicit initial IBP emphasis on existing coalitions as opposed to the service delivery improvement emphasis on practical impact to build momentum for change. The essence of governance reform motivating both concepts is the same, and indeed the SLGP definition of an IBP developed, outlining the concept as having the following objectives:

- Improvement initiatives in selected services, including the service of providing an environment for investment and growth;
- Through these projects to bring pressure upon the variety of institutional barriers to improvement, systematically raising and breaking down these barriers in the limited arena of the project;
- Mobilise sufficient public interest so as to present a popular force for change through the service or growth issue being dealt with; and
- Publicise the project, the barriers to its success that are being raised, and the achievements in breaking down those barriers, widening acceptance of new ways and standards and encouraging similar changes in others⁴

In the context of this latter amended definition, all three SLGP initiatives in SWM would classify as IBPs.

3.3 The broad approach that SLGP took to IBPs

3.3.1 At Federal level

SLGP has worked with FCTA to support a whole suite of reform efforts, including specifically the transformation of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) to privatise solid waste collection and improve the overall management of waste services. The entry point and driver of reform initiating the solid waste management work was the then Minister of FCT. He was keen to draw upon the relevant SLGP experience in the states in this thematic area and clean up Abuja. He had already set up a Public Private Partnership Unit (PPP Unit) under the Ministry, which provided the interlocutor for the initiative.

3.3.2 At State level

SLGP offices with Programme Managers and support staff have been the source of information, advice, training workshops, extra local and international consultancy expertise and funds through initiatives on broad reform efforts in relation to policy and strategy, civil service reform, public financial management and IBPs in all of the SLGP supported States. Interventions in SWM specifically have taken place in Benue and Enugu.

⁴ Issues-Based Projects (IBPs) Definition and Guidelines for Selection, updated SLGP Project Memorandum



SLGP State Offices worked mainly with local civil servants in both states covered in this review, though there was some degree of interaction with civil society groups on awareness raising and sensitisation. **The Solid Waste Management Pilot in Enugu** emerged as an idea from the Enugu State Reform Team following a study tour to South Africa. Consultancy support outlined the need for the clean up of the landfill site for Enugu town, and the design of a pilot project site in the New Haven area of Enugu town to demonstrate an approach of public-private partnership adapted to local circumstances. It became clear following some wider strategy and financial planning that a much broader and deeper reform process was required in relation to solid waste; resulting in the need for legislative change and organisational reform (including restructuring and retrenchment, competitive recruitment, reform of financial management and rebranding of the waste management agency). Difficulties with the New Haven pilot provided lessons for how to deal with private sector providers. Sensitisation and communication work was perceived as an important part of the strategy to change public behaviour in relation to waste. **The Solid Waste Management Pilot in Benue** also emerged from the Benue State Reform Team diagnosis of issues. A Technical Working Group was set up. Detailed studies were carried out, and a pilot set up in a sample of Makurdi's zones. This involved the creation of private sector partnerships, the creation of Neighbourhood Environmental Committees, the establishment of a new integrated waste management facility, revision of the Sanitation Law and restructuring of the State agency into a new regulatory body.

In all cases there was no official Memorandum of Understanding between DFID and the State Government or FCTA. The lack of MoU was particularly problematic in relation to Benue, from which DFID withdrew all its programmes in 2005 due to the lack of progress on reform. A MoU would have given a basis for negotiation around the problems, with clear delineations of roles and responsibilities in relation to particular programmes and therefore explicit commitments from both sides. Instead of a MoU, there was general political permission for SLGP to engage in service delivery reform in each SLGP-supported State. SLGP's key counterparts have been civil servants, with the full support of either the Governor (Enugu and Benue) or the Minister (FCTA).

The choice of IBP was always made on the basis of the wishes of the State Government or the Minister of FCT. Depending on the State context and precise timing of the start up of an initiative within the overall SLGP cycle (the programme longevity and spending patterns have shifted several times as a result of DFID alterations⁵), initiatives were initially framed as relatively 'quick wins', such as Enugu and Benue, or as a more overtly systematic approach in FCT (which had learnt from those earlier experiences regarding expanding timeframes and budgets of 'quick wins').

The overall SLGP approach in this thematic area, as in others, can be categorised as practical, responsive and opportunistic in capitalising on openings for reform, and has always been a process of joint learning with the State Government/Ministry, building on other State's experience where possible.

⁵ Changes in the operational time frame for SLGP during the period 2005 to 2007 resulted in the finance envelopes available to the States expanding and contracting with each alteration



3.4 The Detail of SLGP Learning in SWM

3.4.1 Solid Waste Management: Experience and Lessons

SLGP's experience with solid waste management has provided a series of lessons from all three locations. In **Enugu**, the New Haven pilot was a failure providing valuable lessons for ESWAMA regarding the achievement of effective, transparent procurement for engineering contracts, and around maintaining rigorous contract management. It also provided the entry point into serious institutional reform issues, and the public nature of the Governor's support to the initiative gave the project the required traction to engage in the necessary depth. However, it also became clear that the nature of the reform was multi-faceted, complex and entailed tackling a whole series of issues to achieve real change. Improving services from an inefficient and bloated government agency cannot be conceived as a 'quick win'. Legislative reform was required to embed the necessary changes and the well-managed legislative process garnered increasing support for improving the service. Human resource management reform (retrenchment and recruitment) was carefully orchestrated with the necessary stakeholders, including the unions, providing a model for how such processes could be applied in other parts of government. The Enugu experience also highlighted the key fact that reform in one part of government highlights weaknesses in other parts of the system, in this case exposing the frailty of the Ministry of the Environment.

The Enugu case study provides lessons around government partnership with the private sector, some of which are specific to the theme of solid waste management, and others are more generic. The national tendering process in late 2004 and subsequent allocation of PSPs to zones within Enugu town revealed that the capacity of solid waste PSPs is limited not just within Enugu, but also in Nigeria as a whole. This was reiterated in the tendering process of late 2006, though it must be recognised that some operators may not be willing to engage in contracts with State Governments. Beyond the difficulty of sourcing of effective providers, the project highlighted the fact that the relationship between the government agency and the private sector providers is a difficult one, particularly when both parties are learning and require capacity building. It became clear that ESWAMA needed to play a balancing act between strong monitoring of PSP operations, while also being responsive to their problems. Finally, in Enugu the PSPs are responsible for collecting fees for the services rendered, which has been problematic, as they are viewed as tax collectors. This unpopularity has been compounded where sub-standard services have been provided. There are systems that can facilitate revenue collection, for example using paid sanitation bills as a prerequisite for access to other government services, but careful consideration is required in each particular context about which agent should be responsible for both the setting of rates, and the collection of fees.



The degree of civil society engagement in the project was limited to awareness raising, sensitisation and surveying. This was reinforced by SLGP utilisation of radio to highlight the role of ESWAMA and the responsibilities of citizens in waste management. However, a more fundamental level of interaction with civil society groups was not achieved, as the project was not designed to use community based organisations as a core mechanism for assisting with improved service delivery. It must be noted that the difficulty of engaging with civil society groups on a significant scale in Enugu is considerable, and would have required a complementary sub-initiative within the project⁶.

In **Benue**, parallel lessons have been learnt. Although the project was strongly endorsed by senior government officials (a Commissioner and a Permanent Secretary, supported by the State Reform Team), this was not enough to sustain the changes being incurred by the project, even with the reform of legislation. The lack of financial commitment to sustaining the PSPs exposed the limited high-level appetite for reform.

The Benue experience also highlighted several lessons relating to the selection of PSPs, and their regulation and management. It is critically important to have a transparent and thorough process of engaging PSPs (which must reveal whether they have the required capacity to manage waste collection and disposal). Once engaged, with the performance of PSPs is heavily influenced by the performance and functionality of the government regulator, in this case BENSESA. Therefore the leadership of the government agency is vital, particularly when considering that the sector is a complex one, especially in the context of behavioural change and wider reform processes. In terms of financing of the PPP relationship, in Benue it emerged that the definition of PSP zones should ensure that there is a balance of institutional and residential customers present, and that a standing payment should be put in place for services provided to State institutional customers, thereby easing the private contractor coverage of their direct operational costs (as well as indicating government commitment to the arrangement). It also became clear in Benue that monitoring and audit protocols should be developed and included as part of the contractual agreement between government and PSPs before operations start. Further, a public complaints recording and response system should be developed to provide a tool to monitor the performance of SWM services in terms of service coverage, quality and environmental impact.

In terms of public awareness and participation, in Benue the lesson emerged that a project of this kind must have a clear strategy for public awareness creation as well as a mechanism for effective community participation to ensure that people actively engage in the issue, rather than just passively receive information about it. The Neighbourhood Environmental Committees were successful in this regard, but could have been supported further in terms of their own organisational needs.

⁶ The DFID-funded SJG programme has supported the Neighbourhood Association Bill of 2006, which includes provision for Neighbourhood groups setting up an Environmental/Sanitation Unit to engage with ESWAMA and keep the environment clean: an important but very recent development at the community based organisation level.



The **FCTA** project learnt from the experiences of Enugu and Benue. The reform process undertaken through change in AEPB was driven by the will of the Minister, and ably managed by a new Managing Director. The political leadership and functional management were unflinching in their commitment to reform; a key factor to success. The FCTA experience revealed just how important it is not to underestimate the extent of corruption in a parastatal entrenched in poor practices, and therefore to approach such a reform process in a systematic way.

In terms of partnership with the private sector, in Abuja the model used as one of performance-related contracts for the PSPs, who were not responsible for revenue collection. This put the onus on government to reform its revenue collection processes, leaving the contractors to do what they do best. Revenue management has to set the right balance between covering costs and not billing at too high a level and this government is trying to manage. A five-year contractual period between government and contractor is too long, 2-3 years is more appropriate.

In terms of public awareness and participation, AEPB has attempted to use the press creatively, but stress that the regular interaction of Neighbourhood Associations with the agency is key to real participation in the issue.

For a donor, this kind of input is a logical entry point into reform, as a visible priority issue in itself, but also as an opportunity to set examples for how government can function effectively through the systematic reform of an agency (staffing, revenue, administration, legal backing, policy and strategy and interaction with the public). The type of inputs that the donor provides is important; in Enugu and to a lesser extent Benue, SLGP was drawn into providing considerable support to what should have been covered under recurrent government budgeting; and in retrospect this appears to be an indication of lack of fundamental political commitment from the State Government side. Clearly delineated roles and responsibilities should be laid out within MoUs at the outset, to avoid this kind of dependency developing, and a programme like SLGP being left in an invidious position of either continuing considerable support to maintain momentum, or withdrawing and allowing some of the gains to be lost.

Enugu Solid Waste Management Pilot

Entry Point	Local Driver	Effectiveness
Following an SLGP supported study tour to South Africa in October 2002, members of the Environment and Discipline sub-group of the Enugu State Reform	The PS Ministry of Environment & the Commissioner, Ministry of Environment with the full support of the Governor	1) Institutional The organisational reform process embodied within the shift from ENSEPA to ESWAMA provided examples of best practice for Enugu State Government across a whole range of issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Producing supportive legislation for a new organisation • Human resource management, including both recruitment processes and retrenchment processes as well as the production of a suite of HR tools to assist with proper staff management eg job descriptions, staff handbook and the use of performance relation contracts in a government agency



Entry Point	Local Driver	Effectiveness
<p>Team put forward a proposal to SLGP for a service delivery improvement pilot relating to waste management, based on the privatisation of waste collection.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Image management: a rebranding exercise was utilised to distance the new ESWAMA from the negative image of ENSEPA and give it a clean basis from which to proceed • Communication work (radio, flyers) utilised to ensure that public awareness of ESWAMA was as high as possible, including what its mission was and how to complain using a new dedicated hotline if service delivery did not improve <p>2) Private Sector Partnerships</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The establishment and support of nascent private sector partnerships with government was carefully managed from the open tendering process, to the provision of training, exposure and capacity building and has meant that the commercialisation of waste management has progressed to some extent. A focus on revenue generation has had some success, not only through PSP contracts but also the establishment of Sanitation Courts and their generation of funds <p>3) Citizen Engagement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Efforts to involve civil society in awareness raising about ESWAMA and the links between environmental management and health appear to have had positive effect in terms of public knowledge and related participation in waste management • The reinstatement of monthly Sanitation Days provided a focal day for the populace to participate in cleaning Enugu town <p>But,</p> <p>The system of waste collection involving the private sector has yet to be fully established and to prove its effectiveness and full potential. Although Enugu town is widely regarded to be cleaner than it was, there are considerable problems with the functionality of the PSPs, the effectiveness of ESWAMA as a regulatory agency providing an enabling framework, and the willingness of the public to pay for what is widely regarded as a limited service.</p> <p>Further, effectiveness has diminished considerably with the phasing out of SLGP support: in the early part of the project the activity was extremely effective in setting standards (see above) but this demonstration effect has not proved to sustain even within ESWAMA (new staff appointments without open processes, new PSP contracts issued without due reference to a clearly defined process).</p>



Benue Solid Waste Management Pilot

<i>Entry Point</i>	<i>Local Driver</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>
<p>In 2002 the Benue State Reform Team, supported by SLGP, undertook some broad diagnostic studies and in 2003 established 5 steering committees, including the Environmental Management Steering Committee. It established its own Technical Working Group, which developed an integrated solid waste management programme.</p>	<p>PS, Ministry of Water Resources & Environment, with the support of the wider Benue State Reform Team</p>	<p>1) Institutional Reform for Better Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The establishment of Benue State Environmental and Sanitation Authority (BENSESA) as a regulatory body • The services that were put in place are still operational, and 3 further zones have been tendered. The Benue model has been termed “micro-licensing”, it provided a model for public-private partnership that had not happened in any other sector in Benue, and there is interest from other countries in learning from this type of service arrangement. • The establishment of an Integrated Waste Treatment Facility (IWTF) provided the first central location for waste deposit in the State <p>2) Awareness Raising</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public awareness was created in Makurdi regarding the importance of organised waste management for public health and related environmental issues. The Neighbourhood Environmental Committees became effective in mobilising the public in the three zones to participate in the initiative • The links between environmental management and poverty were explicitly delineated by the project for the first time in Benue and a large group of stakeholders (civil society, local government officials, State government officials and university academics) were brought together to discuss the issues <p>3) Evidence base provided</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A considerable amount of detailed survey and diagnostic work was carried out giving an evidence base for the technical requirements for SWM in Benue for the first time • The revised Sanitation Law better reflected the needs of the State in relation to waste management, and policy and strategy documents were prepared for the first time for the sector <p>But,</p> <p>1) Government Commitment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The lack of commitment by the Governor to the reform led to the scaling down of SLGP activities in this area and ultimately the withdrawal of DFID from Benue State. This directly affected the operationalisation of reform, specifically the payment of PSPs which government would not commit to taking on, though it was stipulated in the Revised Sanitation Law



Entry Point	Local Driver	Effectiveness
		2) Technical & Institutional/Regulation Challenges <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PSPs did not have sufficient equipment to deal with the scale of SWM with which they were tasked, and the IWTF staff were not adequately trained to operate the landfill site • The Ministry of Water Resources & Environment hampered the development of the IWTF, causing delay to the whole project • A PSP performance framework should have been developed as an attachment to legislation and is still outstanding

FCTA Solid Waste Management

Entry Point	Local Driver	Effectiveness
<p>In late 2003 SLGP engaged with the Ministry of FCT regarding SWM, holding preliminary discussions with the Minister and the Federal Minister of the Environment regarding sharing lessons from the Enugu and Benue experiences. The Minister of FCT had created a Public-Private Partnership Unit in his office, and SWM was one of the first issues he wanted to</p>	<p>The Minister for FCT & Director AEPB</p>	1) Institutional <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AEPB has been transformed from a dysfunctional and corrupt organisation into a functional regulatory unit. The reform approach is being applied to the Water Board of FCTA • Successful public-private partnerships have been set up • The approach has been extended to satellite towns under a newly developed licensing agreement approach, including the involvement of Area Councils 2) Financial <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption has been substantially reduced and AEPB revenue has increased enormously. The agency is no longer receiving subventions from FCTA to deliver its services or to pay its contractors • More effective systems are in place for accounting and billing, including bill distribution. AEPB now has the capacity to bill 78,000 customers, up from the 18,000 before the project 3) Personnel <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AEPB has been through a right-sizing exercise with no conflict with the unions, and the remaining staff are more committed 4) Environmental <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abuja has become a much cleaner city and is exceptional by sub-Saharan African standards <p>But,</p> 1) Institutional



<i>Entry Point</i>	<i>Local Driver</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>
address through the unit.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was serious and entrenched corruption within and beyond AEPB which was not easy to deal with and prevent for the future • The Director of AEPB could have benefited from structured support as she was bearing the brunt of responsibility for difficult change processes • AEPB staff were apprehensive about the changes in the payment of their own wages (to come from IGR), and this has taken time to get used to <p>2) Public Private Partnership</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was challenging to settle on a monitoring and scoring system that was acceptable to both government and private sector partners, because the payment of the latter was dependent on the scoring <p>3) Payment for Services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persuading Abuja residents and organisations to pay for waste management services is an ongoing task. The project worked with magistrates to improve the effectiveness of the legal system re non-payment. However, even for those willing to pay the system is not very convenient and requires further work

4.0 GENERIC LESSONS LEARNED

4.1 Lessons for State Governments

Political commitment and leadership of the reform initiatives is crucial both to start, and to sustain reform effort amongst civil servants and to ensure that new practices are implemented, including the commitment of the required human and financial resources to enable implementation. Without clear political support, the challenges of the change processes will overwhelm the desire for change. The commitment of the Governor and EXCO is important to the success and long-term sustainability of changing practice; and the need for it must be clearly understood and endorsed by this group.

Senior bureaucratic commitment to change is also critical; particularly where the change is operational and requires the consistent support of senior bureaucrats to ensure that practices will change and not revert back to the previous familiar ways. However it was clear that in Benue this was not enough alone, and that the political commitment was lacking.



All government stakeholders need a clear picture of why it is necessary to reform; and this must be done early on in the process, without constant communication and discussion of reform measures there will inevitably be resistance at many levels, which slows the pace of change. In AEPB in FCTA, staff were concerned about the security of their own salaries under the new system of revenue collection and management (and the lack of government subvention), but this has been allayed by the increasing efficiency of the agency.

Addressing resistance to change is best achieved by maximising communication and reorientation opportunities and exchanging ideas within and across government and with civil society. In Enugu a lot of communication tools were used such as radio, flyers and posters to advertise and inform the public about the nature of what was happening. In addition a concerted effort was made to rebrand the unpopular ENSEPA into a new ESWAMA, in part to draw a line under the poor practices of the past

‘Coalitions for change’: these have not been well demonstrated in this review as the drivers for solid waste management reform have come from within State Government rather than popular demand. Building up coalitions for change may be one of the core factors affecting sustainability of change, in this thematic area through consistent engagement of the government agency (ESWAMA, BENSESA or AEPB) with neighbourhood groups who have a direct interest in ensuring the environmental health of their physical environment

Support from development partners adds an incentive to the reform process, and brings other international experience to assist and inform, but the State Government must take ownership of the reform process and therefore take responsibility for it. Inculcating the sense of ownership must permeate every step of the initiative, from conception, through the selection of external service providers to managing implementation. The importance of government involvement in all stages was highlighted in all three cases of SWM; and the lack of sustained commitment has been illustrated clearly in Benue and to a lesser extent in Enugu

4.2 Lessons for donors

Optimal entry points: Solid Waste Management serves as a good entry point into institutional reform; it is a fundamentally important issue in terms of the physical environment and public health and can have visible impact to show that reform can make a difference. However, it is not a ‘quick win’ even in the most conducive of reform environments, such as FCTA.

Lesson learning between States and between States and the Federal level is important and should be supported as much as possible, to encourage the transfer of experience between State governments and between State and Federal government in specific areas of civil service reform around the practicalities of what has worked and not worked, and in the broader approaches to institutional change. This can be done through lesson learning exercises such as this one, but also through the specific sharing of knowledge on particular aspects of reform as a State becomes interested in an area in which there is already an established body of experience in other States, such as the sharing of knowledge from Enugu and Benue to inform FCTA’s approach.



Sustaining commitment: Donors may need to commit support over a long time period and be flexible in response to what emerges through change processes; all of the reform activities considered by this review have taken longer to address than first anticipated. The length of time commitment required varies according to the consistency of leadership, the capacity of government officials, the willingness to change at all levels, and the extent of the change being embarked upon. Further, it is critically important for the donor to invest properly in supporting management as well as technical inputs; a fact highlighted by the AEPB experience. Systematically addressing corruption in a dysfunctional agency requires considerable management and leadership skills, and such a project will be hugely dependent on a few key dedicated individuals, who may need much more support than technical consultancy inputs.

Clarity of partnership: It is important that donors make the principles of partnership increasingly clear in joint memoranda of understanding which delineate relative responsibilities and levels of resource commitment to an initiative; it must be clear where donor support will be likely to end so that a State government knows the extent of financial commitment it is taking on. In Enugu, SLGP support to ESWAMA was considerable and it has been noted elsewhere that it appeared a culture of dependency may have taken root⁷ (in relation to all DFID programmes and not just SLGP). In Benue, when it appeared that there was limited political commitment to the solid waste management reform process (amongst other DFID funded work), the lack of MoU prohibited proper negotiation between donor and State Government about how to redress the balance.

The optimum role for non-state actors in relation to the area of solid waste management is two-fold. At the Community level, the critical element is to ensure that there are organisations to interact with the State agency both in terms of monitoring PSP operations but also taking an active part in ensuring that neighbourhoods become cleaner and that this is viewed as a public responsibility as well as a government one. At the NGO level, organisations play an important role in sensitisation and awareness raising regarding the issue. Further the media has a key function to play in this regard. If a donor is going to engage with these issues, they require proper consideration at the outset of the project, in parallel to the institutional reform issues.

Sustaining wider reforms from initiatives in this field: the case studies do not show a direct line from a solid waste management pilot into wider reform, other than perhaps in terms of FCTA; where the new Minister was already committed to a widespread process of change within government and clearly had waste management on his list of early priorities. In Benue, although much of what was achieved in the project has sustained, the early termination of the project (as well as withdrawal of all DFID programmes) was indicative of the fact that the donor felt that wider reforms were not going to be forthcoming. In Enugu, the ESWAMA example set a model for good practice in terms of institutional reform (recruitment, restructuring, tendering and management of contracts and so on), it is not clear that this has been directly applied in other parts of government.

⁷ SLGP OPR 2006

Annex 1

Consolidated Case Studies

Case Study 1:	Solid Waste Management Pilot, Enugu
Case Study 2:	Solid Waste Management Pilot, Benue
Case Study 3:	Solid Waste Management Pilot, FCTA

Case Study 1 Solid Waste Management Pilot, Enugu

Initiative	Solid Waste Management Pilot
Partner	ENSEPA (Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency), later ESWAMA (Enugu State Waste Management Authority), State Government of Enugu
Starting point	By 2002, the State Environmental Protection Agency (ENSEPA), which was responsible for waste management, was extremely unpopular. It was ineffective in fulfilling its function; Enugu town had a waste management problem that was both unsightly and unhealthy. ENSEPA was a corrupt, inefficient and overstaffed parastatal, and there was widespread recognition both within government (even within ENSEPA itself) and in the general public that reform was required.
<p>Expected outcomes and outputs, and original theory of change</p> <p>Expected outcome: A reformed waste management authority that would provide an example of enhanced service delivery to the State Government of Enugu and its citizenry to encourage broader governance reform</p> <p><i>Intermediary outcome:</i> Improved waste management in Enugu town</p> <p>Expected outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) A functioning waste management authority that was fit for its purpose b) Improved coordination between different tiers of government on waste management c) A established model of private sector partnership with government for waste management d) A model of government interaction with civil society in awareness raising and monitoring service delivery 	



Theory of Change:

That the pilot would be an example of how to address institutional problems within government, such as poor public expenditure management, poor human resource management, a lack of attention to image, communication and consultation and a lack of experience in both community involvement and private sector involvement. If it could be demonstrated that multi-faceted reform of a government agency was possible and show visible improvement of service delivery, then the State Government would be encouraged to apply the same reform effort in other agencies.

Driver of Change: PS Ministry of Environment, Commissioner Ministry of Environment with the full support of the Governor

The initiative commenced in January 2003

Process, activities and related events

Following an SLGP supported study tour to South Africa in October 2002, members of the Environment and Discipline sub-group of the Enugu State Reform Team (ESRT) put forward a proposal to SLGP for a service delivery improvement pilot relating to waste management, based on the privatisation of waste collection. An international consultant reviewed the proposal in early 2003. In the absence of an SLGP Programme Manager for Enugu, the international consultant and a local consultant were tasked with taking the process forward. Early priority actions focused on the clean up of the landfill site and the establishment of a pilot project site in the New Haven Area of Enugu town, as well as involving NGOs in sensitisation and awareness raising. With the arrival of a new SLGP Programme Manager in May, the pace of the project increased significantly. Strategy and financial planning workshops were held in June, bringing together personnel from Benue and Enugu. These sessions underlined the need for fundamental institutional change, particularly the need for a new solid waste management authority under the Ministry of Environment. A draft Solid Waste Management Strategy was developed, which recommended the drafting of a new Waste Management Authority Bill. The project supported this process and the law was promulgated the following year, providing the basis for the new ESWAMA. In addition, a study on revenue and expenditure tracking in ENSEPA had exposed the extent of weakness of the financial management system and the need to reorganise the Accounts Department.

In the meantime, the development and operation of the landfill site and the New Haven pilot had continued, beset with delays and difficulties relating to Private Sector operators (PSPs), land acquisition and the practical operation of the model proposed for New Haven. SLGP invested heavily in the landfill site, supporting the development of its infrastructure and management. By mid 2004 it was clear that drastic change was required, and that the New Haven pilot had failed. The organisational changes for the new ESWAMA prepared for much more fundamental change in waste management, learning from the pilot problems. SLGP supported and assisted a competitive recruitment process for senior staff, and a successful process of retrenchment of 119 staff. SLGP also supported a national competitive tendering process for the selection of PSPs to carry out waste management under ESWAMA, followed by training for the successful companies. ESWAMA was formally launched in early 2005 and SLGP provided support in refurbishing the building, re-branding the organisation, setting up a hotline for complaints regarding waste management, and jingles and publicity for ESWAMA. By mid 2005 SLGP support to the process was reduced, in the expectation that the State Government would take full financial responsibility for waste management through ESWAMA. In mid 2005, SLGP commissioned a review of the project to date, and the management of the landfill site was



handed over to the State in August 2005. A draft Enugu State Environmental Protection Bill was prepared with the support of SLGP at the end of 2005, but was not taken further by the State. The landfill site degenerated by February 2006, from a sanitary landfill site to a poorly managed open dumpsite. The MD of ESWAMA's contract was terminated at the end of February 2006, following long conflict with the Ministry of Environment, and a new MD was appointed. SLGP continued to support particular activities with ESWAMA, but spend had largely tailed off by mid 2006.

Activities and related events:

- Jan 2003: ESRT sub-group submits proposal to SLGP, followed by consultant review to chart way forward
- May 2003: New SLGP Programme Manager for Enugu
- June 2003: SLGP convened strategy and financial planning workshops
- Dec 2003: Solid Waste Management Strategy finalised
- July 2004: Enugu State Waste Management Authority (ESWAMA) Law promulgated
- Sept 2004: Appointment of a new MD of ESWAMA following competitive recruitment process
- Late 2004: National open tendering process for PSPs for all zones of Enugu town
- Dec 2004: Staff retrenchment; 119 voluntary redundancies. 3 new Heads of Dept appointed for ESWAMA
- Jan 2005: Governor launched ESWAMA
- June 2005: SLGP review of the project
- Aug 2005: SLGP handover of management of Ugwuaji landfill site to ESWAMA
- Sept 2005: SLGP assists with redevelopment of a transfer station to become an Environmental Court
- Feb 2006: Contract for MD ESWAMA terminated
- Mar 2006: New MD appointed without competitive recruitment process
- Consultancy on ESWAMA financial system improvement (second input September)
- Apr 2006: Enugu Landfill Management Review
- May 2006: Sensitisation campaign by an NGO in Abakpa area of Enugu town on rights and responsibilities until July. Further work by same NGO in May-June 2007

Successes and achievements

- a) The institutional reform process embodied by the shift from ENSEPA to ESWAMA provided an example for Enugu State Government across a whole swathe of issues:
 - a. producing supportive legislation for a new organisation,
 - b. human resource management, including both recruitment processes and retrenchment processes as well as the production of a suite of HR tools to assist with proper staff management e.g. job descriptions, a staff handbook, and the use of performance related contracts in a government agency
 - c. image management: a rebranding exercise was utilised to distance ESWAMA from the negative image of ENSEPA and give it a clean basis from which to proceed
 - d. communication work (radio jingles, ESWAMA staff slots on Good Day Enugu and flyers) were all utilised to ensure that the citizenry of Enugu knew that ESWAMA had been established, what its mission was and how to complain using a dedicated hotline if service delivery did not improve
- b) The establishment and support of nascent private sector partnerships with government was carefully managed from the open tendering process for PSPs, to the provision of training, exposure and capacity building, and has meant that the commercialisation of



waste management has progressed to some degree. A focus on revenue generation has had some success, not only through PSP contracts but also the establishment of Sanitation Courts and their related generation of funds

- c) There were several efforts throughout the project period to involve civil society in awareness raising about the work of ESWAMA and to draw the links between environmental management and health, which appear to have had positive effect in terms of public knowledge and related participation in waste management
- d) The reinstatement of Sanitation Days provided a focal day every month for the populace to participate in cleaning Enugu town

Shortcomings and challenges

- a) The extent of the governmental commitment to an institutional reform effort has not been sustained in terms of consolidating best practice in both recruitment and contractual tendering. A new MD of ESWAMA has been appointed without a competitive recruitment process in March 2006, the re-tendering of PSP contracts in December 2006 did not follow through with the results of a clearly defined process.
- b) Conflict between the MD and the senior officials of the Ministry of Environment bedevilled the emergence and functioning of ESWAMA
- c) The culture of dependency on SLGP established in the early part of the project proved to be a difficult pattern to break, with repeated requests to SLGP to fund various elements of ESWAMA's work after the handover of the landfill site and the withdrawal of heavy SLGP support, and the State Government did not commit the required degree of regularised funding to sustain the extent of the early reform (in July 2007 14 months of ESWAMA salaries are outstanding and operational costs are insufficient; resulting in low morale of staff)
- d) The capacity of the PSPs to deliver services has remained an issue; several of those who were involved initially who did have the capacity to operate effectively withdrew because the government was not providing the enabling environment required to support functioning public-private partnerships, and those that have remained are the local, less effective companies who need capacity building (and support through the loan of equipment as well as training) to bring them up to a higher level of functionality, which the government is not providing. Revenue sharing between PSPs and ESWAMA has also proved problematic
- e) The role of the PSPs in collecting revenue has continued to cause problems for their operations and they do not feel adequately supported by ESWAMA. They are viewed as "tax collectors" by the public and are unpopular as a result. Establishing a culture of payment for waste collection and disposal services has proved to be difficult amongst the general public, and amongst government institutions, some of whom will not pay their tariffs
- f) Real engagement of civil society in the overall effort to improve service delivery has been limited: NGOs have been contracted for awareness raising but have not systematically engaged in monitoring service delivery



<p>Costs</p> <p>Consultancy: £167,162</p> <p>Capital (<i>sub-divided if it includes several expensive items</i>):</p> <p>Front Wheel Loader purchase: £70,553</p> <p>Other (including plant hire): £265,635</p> <p>Sundry: £24,893</p> <p>TOTAL: £528,243 (to May 2007)</p>	
<p>Relevance</p>	<p>Relevance to Nigerian stakeholders (including State Governments)</p> <p>In terms of its importance to State Government, the project was relevant; it was an area that clearly needed reform and about which there was little vested political interest preventing it from happening. The idea came from the Enugu State Reform Team and had the strong backing of the Governor. In the past Enugu was one of the cleanest cities in Nigeria and the project was seen by many as an attempt to restore Enugu to its former glory.</p> <p>Relevance to DFID, other donors and their programmes</p> <p>The real importance of the project to DFID was as an example of service delivery improvement; reforming a parastatal to deliver services more effectively. As an example of the possibilities of change through practical action in public service reform, the project was highly relevant to both the State Government and to DFID. The approach to reform had been encouraged as a mechanism for achieving visible and rapid change to provide a model for more fundamental reform throughout government.</p>
<p>Effectiveness</p>	<p>The system of waste collection involving the private sector has yet to be fully established and to prove its effectiveness. Although Enugu town is widely regarded to be cleaner than it was, there are considerable problems regarding the functionality of the PSPs, the effectiveness of ESWAMA as a regulatory agency providing an enabling framework, and the willingness of the public to pay for what is often regarded as a limited service.</p> <p>Effectiveness has diminished considerably with the phasing out of SLGP support: in the early part of the project the activity was extremely effective in relation to setting standards for contractual and procurement procedures, setting examples in relation to human resource management issues, and in providing a template for the privatisation of services. However, this demonstration effect has not proved to sustain even within ESWAMA (new staff appointments, new contracts issued).</p>



Efficiency	The project has been expensive in terms of capital inputs (64%), some of which has not been efficient spend (though refer to Sustainability section below in terms of DFID encouragement to spend). The New Haven pilot was a costly failure, which though yielding lessons, could potentially have been avoided if more scoping work had been done. However, much was achieved in terms of setting examples for institutional reform, and for practical testing of the challenges of public-private partnerships. Ultimately the judgement of efficiency is directly related to the overall impact of the project, which has been mixed.
Impact	The impact of the project has been less profound than the indications of 2005 seemed to project: service delivery has not improved significantly. However, although ESWAMA has not met the high expectations of 2003-05 and the landfill site has significantly declined, it must be noted that Enugu town is cleaner than it was, and that public awareness of the importance of waste management has risen significantly. An SLGP survey in 2006 found that 62% of those surveyed thought that the city was cleaner than in 2003, compared to 34% who thought the opposite.
Sustainability	It now appears that the early gains of the project were so marked because SLGP intervened heavily, and that only some of the benefits of the project will be sustained. The DFID OPR in September 2006 noted that the earlier working relationship established with Enugu State Government “may have encouraged a culture of dependency”. In 2004 particularly, DFID encouraged SLGP (and other programmes) to increase the pace of their expenditure, which resulted in this dynamic emerging. The good practice that was so clearly demonstrated in the arena of human resource management and contracting has not been sustained within ESWAMA, and the PSP role remains fragile and limited in effectiveness. ESWAMA is still working more effectively than ENSEPA did, though not to the level of initial SLGP expectations.
<p>What lessons have been learned to inform future programme design?</p> <p>For government partners:</p> <p><i>Learning from a failed pilot</i></p> <p>a) Much was learned through the failure of the pilot attempted at New Haven, which provided valuable lessons for ESWAMA. The lessons related to a swathe of difficulties around achieving effective, transparent procurement for engineering contracts, and around maintaining rigorous contract management. Early project attempts to avoid corruption, fraud and breach of contract were insufficient, with contractors defaulting, carrying out sub-standard work and taking months to do jobs that should have entailed weeks. SLGP moved rapidly into a mode of tightly controlled procurement procedures in an attempt to close the loopholes, with the project starting to set standards as an example for reform in service delivery.</p>	



Moving from the pilot to institutional reform

- b) The New Haven pilot provided the entry to serious institutional reform issues, and the public nature of the SLGP and the Governor's commitment to the pilot gave the project the required 'traction' to engage with reform
- c) Improving services from inefficient and bloated government agencies cannot be conceived as a 'quick win': the processes take time and reveal why reform has not been achieved before now
- d) Legislative reform is required to embed change and if well managed, can garner increasing support for change
- e) Human resource management reform (retrenchment and recruitment) can be achieved if well managed, and show how these processes can be applied in other parts of government
- f) Institutional reform is multi-faceted, complex and requires tackling a whole series of issues to achieve real change within a single agency

Knock-on effects to other parts of government

- g) Reform in one part of government highlights weakness in other parts of the system. The project focused on ESWAMA as an implementation agent, exposing the frailty of the Ministry of the Environment. Ongoing friction between the two organisations bedevilled the project. Although ESWAMA is under the supervision and nominal management of the Ministry, in reality the ESWAMA MD was reporting directly to the Governor, and bypassing the Ministry. This caused real resentment (and was a contributory factor to the termination of her contract), compounded by the fact that the Ministry was facing its own challenges in relation to re-designated areas of operation and related human resource needs, as well as the implementation of its own strategy. The Ministry did not have the capacity to supervise ESWAMA, and this was made vividly clear through the project.

Private Sector Partnership

- h) The project has illustrated core problems with the privatisation of solid waste management in Nigeria. The national tendering process in late 2004 and subsequent allocation of PSPs to zones within Enugu town revealed that the capacity of PSPs is not just limited within Enugu, but in Nigeria as a whole. This was reiterated with the tendering process in late 2006, though it must be noted that some operators may not be willing to engage in State Government contracts
- i) With ESWAMA attempting to fulfil its role as regulator, the relationship between government and PSPs is a difficult one: it became clear that ESWAMA needed to play a balancing act between strong monitoring of the PSP operations, whilst at the same time being responsive to their problems. Under the project, a degree of PSP training was carried out in recognition of this issue, but many of them lack their own equipment and require access to ESWAMA machinery, much of which remains non-functional
- j) In Enugu, the PSPs are responsible for collecting fees, which has been problematic, as the private operators are viewed as tax collectors and are extremely unpopular as a result, particularly if they are viewed as operating inefficiently and not providing a good service. There are systems that can make revenue collection much easier, for example using sanitation bills as a prerequisite for other services (school, clinic etc) but careful consideration is required about which agent should be responsible for both the setting of rates, and the collection of fees



Interaction with Civil Society

- k) The degree of civil society engagement in the project has been limited to awareness raising, sensitisation and surveying; which has certainly had an effect in terms of public awareness of the issues. This was reinforced by SLGP utilisation of communication mechanisms such as the Good Day Enugu radio programme and jingles to highlight ESWAMA, the change from ENSEPA, and the responsibilities of the citizen in waste management
- l) A higher level of interaction with civil society groups has not been achieved through the project, partly because the project was not designed to use community based groups as a core mechanism for improving service delivery, it focused on government reform. In addition, the difficulty of engaging with CSOs in Enugu on a significant scale (beyond a few NGOs) is considerable. The SJG programme has supported the Neighbourhood Association Bill of 2006, which includes provision for Neighbourhood groups setting up an Environmental/Sanitation Unit to engage with ESWAMA and keep the environment clean; an important but very recent development at the Community Based Organisation level

For donors:

Entry point & political will for governance reform:

- a) Waste was a visible issue about which there was widespread dissatisfaction in Enugu. ENSEPA embodied all of the problems of a corrupt, overstuffed and inefficient parastatal and was extremely unpopular. There was no vested political interest in maintaining the status quo; therefore the situation presented a logical entry point for a service delivery improvement project. This project was conceptualised as an opportunity to engage on a practical issue to improve service delivery. As such it made logical sense, and for a long time it was the only practical project with which SLGP was involved in Enugu. It provided the basis for building up a degree of trust between the programme and the State Government.
- b) The consistent support of the Governor was fundamental to the extent and depth of reform achieved over the first two years of the project. However, this support was not sustained, and in 2006 it became clear that what had appeared to be fundamental reform was starting to slide backwards: inadequate funding for ESWAMA hampered its operations, a new MD of ESWAMA was appointed without a competitive recruitment process, and there was a lack of clarity and transparency around the award of new PSP contracts. Retrospectively it seems that the reversal of some of the reform gains could have been predicted, but at the time it seemed clear that the political environment for change was in place and that an agency such as ENSEPA could be reformed as a model in government. This is a fundamental governance issue; it seems clear that a real appetite for reform cannot be leveraged and enhanced through the operation of individual projects such as this alone, and that the will to address the much wider systemic issues of governance must be clearly articulated. It now appears that the clean up of ENSEPA represented a relatively easy step to take for the Governor, which served his purpose of engaging with the donor but did not actually represent a real commitment to broader reform
- c) SLGP invested heavily in the project (both in terms of time and equipment), repeatedly stepping in to assist the fledgling ESWAMA, without having a contract or deal with the State Government which outlined the relative roles and responsibilities of the two parties. Without such an agreement marking stages (and indicators for projected results) it is difficult for the donor to enforce anything, or have any



assurance that the Government will play the envisaged reform role. Having achieved a considerable amount in solid waste management over two years, SLGP was in an invidious position of either allowing the gains to slide, or to keep stepping in to paper over the emerging cracks (as illustrated most vividly by the management of the landfill site, which was in good condition at the point of handover but which has severely declined since). A step-by-step contractual partnership would be a better basis from which to operate; though budgeting for this may be difficult, and unpredictable

Project Management

- d) The establishment of a core team of trusted professional consultants as project advisers covering a range of skills was essential to the project's achievements, particularly considering that there were 3 SLGP Project Managers over the course of the project. Consultant skills included coverage of engineering, legal matters, institutional development and human resources management as well as environmental management. A balance of international and local consultancy was used for the project to good effect, though specialist knowledge of solid waste management was the weakest area of input, which would have challenged the original ENSEPA proposed model more closely, and potentially avoided some of the New Haven pilot problems
- e) Limited project monitoring against a predetermined model of change has been a missed opportunity; which relates back to the issues outlined under point c) above: a more clearly expressed framework at the outset would delineate the expectations of the project as well as providing the basis for recording progress (or lack of progress). This would be a management tool as well as a basis for understanding the expectation at the outset as staff change and institutional memory is lost

Further information

SLGP documentation:

SLGP Reports.

Key contact points:

Chiinedu Onu, ex Commissioner Ministry of Environment, now
Commissioner Public Utilities

Sir Sam Umesie, ex Permanent Secretary Ministry of Environment
Lynne Barratt, Consultant to SLGP

Other relevant bodies of information:

DFID OPR of SLGP, September 2006

Case Study 2 Solid Waste Management Pilot, Benue

Initiative	Solid Waste Management Pilot Project
Partner	Ministry of Water Resources & Environment
Starting point	<p>The Ministry of Water Resources and Environment of Benue State, created in 1999, is responsible for all environmental issues including the formulation of policy to assist the state institutions in improving and enhancing services for collection, treatment and disposal of solid waste. However since its inception, the Ministry had fundamental problems such as: a lack of clear policy, strategy and action plans, no clear institutional control over its parastatals (resulting in overlapping roles and responsibilities), and financial constraints. The public considered solid waste management to be the sole responsibility of government, but the government was simply not managing the issue. Makurdi the State capital was therefore unclean, characterised by widespread littering and blockage of drainage channels, and therefore pools of water which can act as breeding grounds for mosquito larvae. Uncontrolled dumpsites were evident across the town. This was a case where it was possible to act before a crisis situation emerged in health and environmental terms.</p>
<p>Expected outcomes and outputs, and original theory of change</p> <p>Expected outcome: A reformed, improved, more efficient integrated waste management system functional in Makurdi and planned for Benue State</p> <p><i>Intermediate outcomes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government withdrawal from direct service provision and revenue collection to play a strategic regulatory role, with parallel • Job creation in the private sector <p>Expected outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situation Analysis (including options for institutional restructuring/strengthening) • Two models of service delivery tested in 3 zones of Makurdi • An integrated waste treatment facility designed for Makurdi • Solid Waste Management Programme designed for Benue State <p>Theory of Change: A solid waste management pilot would serve as a model for better service planning and improved service delivery in Benue State. Solid waste management was an uncontentious entry point into the larger arena of governance reform, and a visible practical initiative with which to</p>	



engage.

Driver of Change: PS, Ministry of Water Resources & Environment, with the support of the wider Benue State Reform Team

The initiative commenced in September 2002

Process, activities and related events

In 2002 the Benue State Reform Team, supported by SLGP, undertook a number of broad diagnostic studies and in 2003 established five steering committees to deal with the issues raised. One of the five, the Environmental Management Steering Committee (EMSC) established the Solid Waste Technical Working Group (TWG). As part of its work in developing an integrated solid waste management programme, the TWG identified three major initiatives to be undertaken: a survey of waste generation in the urban area of Makurdi, the development of a pilot solid waste management project and a detailed land use survey of the pilot area. In order to maximise the chances of success and later wide-scale application across the State, it was considered important to first concentrate on implementing a scheme in a sample of urban areas of Makurdi with contrasting socio-economic characters. Following discussions and field visits the TWG proposed and it was agreed to locate the pilot project in three (of the 21) zones of Makurdi as follows: Madikpo/Wadata Environmental Zone (high density), Lobi/Kwararafa Environmental Zone (medium density) and Old GRA Environmental Zone (low density).

Project implementation began in early 2004, managed by the TWG, reporting to the EMSC. SLGP provided ongoing support to the TWG through the inputs of specialist international consultants (particularly a solid waste specialist), and involvement in regular meetings of all stakeholders. Under the pilot project, several activities were undertaken: selection, licensing and training of a PSP by open tender to service 2 of the 3 zones (with the Urban Development Board servicing the third zone), establishment of Neighbourhood Environmental Committees (NECs), establishment of a new integrated waste management facility (IWTF, a landfill site), and revision of the Sanitation Law, followed by restructuring of BESEPA (Benue State Environmental Protection Agency) into a new regulatory body BENSESA (Benue State Environmental Sanitation Authority). Recruitment of a new Managing Director for BENSESA followed an open process, and three candidates were short listed for the Governor to consider. However, he chose another individual who had not been through the selection process. SLGP paid the PSPs in the start up period of operation (May-August 2005) because government funds were not forthcoming. Benue State Government did not respond to a request from the Commissioner of Water Resources and Environment to rectify this situation. The clear lack of government financial commitment to the initiative led to the withdrawal of SLGP from the programme.

Activities and related events:

Feb 2002: Preliminary Environmental Assessment (Desk Study) of Benue

Apr 2003: Environmental Management Steering Committee (EMSC) established, followed by TWG

May 2003: Poverty/Environmental Linkages for Benue State Reform Team

June 2003: Documentation of Available Information on the Solid Waste Situation in Nigeria: A Case Study of Benue and Enugu States

Oct. 2003: Development of an Integrated Urban Solid Waste Management Programme for Benue State

Nov. 2003: Survey of the Solid Waste Situation in Makurdi Urban Area

Dec 2003: Physical Survey of the Pilot Project Area in the Makurdi Urban Area and Development



of a Solid Waste Management Customer Database
 Jan. 2004: Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Programme, Pilot Project Design Final Report.
 Mar. 2004: Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Project Review
 Apr. 2004: Consultancy in Public Awareness and Service Delivery Improvement Pilots: Draft Report.
 Jun 2004: EIA of Integrated Waste Treatment Facility commenced (completed September 2004)
 Mar 2005: Revised Sanitation Law promulgated & BENSESA formal launch with Deputy Governor present
 May 2005: Licensing 2 PSPs (one private sector operator and UDB), pilot launched, waste collection commenced
 July 2005: Consultancy input for energising Neighbourhood Environmental Committees & establishment of Operational Guidelines, Monitoring/Enforcement Indicators for BENSESA and PSPs
 Aug. 2005: Consultancy input to support strategy and policy development for SWM and institutional restructuring of BENSESA
 Sep 2005: MD of BENSESA in post
 Dec 2005: SLGP completion of project support

Successes and achievements

Institutional Reform for Better Management

- The establishment of Benue State Environmental and Sanitation Authority (BENSESA) as a regulatory body was successful, though its successful operation became a challenge (see section below)
- The services that were put in place are still operated, and three further zones have been tendered. The Benue model for SWM as been termed “micro-licensing” and there is interest from other parts of the world in the type of service arrangement put in place. Licensing of Private Service Providers (PSPs) provided a model for public-private partnership which had not happened in any other sector in Benue
- The establishment of an Integrated Waste Treatment Facility (IWTF) provided the first central location for waste deposit in the State

Awareness regarding SWM

- Public awareness created in Makurdi regarding the importance of organised waste management for public health and related environmental issues. The Neighbourhood Environmental Committees became effective in mobilising the public in the three zones to participate in the initiative
- There was an overt attempt by the project to draw the links between environmental management and poverty. This had not previously been done; and a large group of stakeholders (civil society, local government officials, state government officials, university academics) were brought together to discuss the issues

Evidence base for Effective Management & Regulation

- A considerable amount of survey work and diagnostic studies by consultants provided an evidence base concerning the technical requirements for solid waste management for the first time in Benue
- The revised Sanitation Law provided an updated piece of legislation which better reflected the needs of the State in regard to waste management



- Policy and strategy documents were prepared for the first time for the sector

Shortcomings and challenges

Government Commitment to Reform

- The lack of commitment by the Governor to the reform led to the scaling down of SLGP activities in this area (and untimely the withdrawal of DFID from Benue State). This was obviously a much broader issue than simply commitment to the SWM project, but directly affected the operationalisation of the reform in this area. Specifically, there was a key issue concerning the payment of the PSPs, as stipulated in the Revised Sanitation Law, and the Commissioner of Water Resources and Environment felt compelled to write to the Governor in October 2005 in an attempt to release the payment of tariffs from government to the PSPs. The Commissioner and the Permanent Secretary had shown unflinching commitment to the project from the outset, but this was insufficient to ensure wider governmental commitment.

Technical Challenges

- The PSPs did not have sufficient equipment to deal with the scale of the SWM with which they were tasked. The State Government paid for UDB to upgrade their equipment in preparation for implementation, but immediately following repairs the vehicles were vandalized. DaniHopeWell Services did not have enough equipment to commit to the project, despite appearances during a physical inspection during the tendering process
- The IWTF staff were not adequately trained to operate the landfill site once it was operational

Institutional Challenges

- The Ministry of Water Resources & Environment did not provide the necessary infrastructural development at the landfill site on time. This was due to the direct involvement of the Director of Engineering Services on site, who lacked commitment to the project and who had not been part of project design. He took personal responsibility for the site, ignoring the advice of the existing site engineer who knew the project well. As a result, there was some slippage in the activities related to the Integrated Waste Treatment Facility, and this had a knock on effect for the whole programme, as the pilot project launch took place much later than was planned

Regulation Issues

- A PSP performance framework should have been developed as an attachment to the legislation, as regulatory guidelines. This should have included an appropriate public complaints mechanism to ensure that citizens had a mechanism for ensuring that they could report PSP inefficiency and lack of delivery. This was an indication that the reform process had not progressed to a sufficient level of accountability for service delivery. The EMSC did not consider this at the required time in the process, and it still has not been addressed



<p>Costs</p> <p>Consultancy: £147,755</p> <p>Capital (mainly companies involved in the system): £91,742</p> <p>Others: £15,000</p> <p>TOTAL: £254,497</p>	
Relevance	<p>Relevance to Nigerian stakeholders (including State Governments)</p> <p>Several previous attempts at efficient solid waste management had failed in Benue, and in 2002 waste was recognised as a high priority issue. The State Government and the public were dissatisfied with the situation in Makurdi, Gboko and Otukpo. In addition to the obvious governance and public health/environmental benefits offered by the pilot, the programme aimed to catalyse employment creation and economic development. The environmental sanitation industry is yet to be fully developed in Benue State, and is set to become a new productive sector of the economy. Many of the potential jobs would be low or semi-skilled, resulting in significant income opportunities for the poorer section of society. The pilot was therefore very relevant.</p> <p>Relevance to DFID, other donors and their programmes</p> <p>The issue of solid waste management cuts across a number of SLGP and DFID initiatives involving poverty links, public expenditure management and service delivery. Furthermore, the SWM pilot project provides a good example of how to achieve aspects of change generic to any government service.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>A considerable amount of information on solid waste in Benue is now available. A new regulatory body, BENSESA, was established by law. Neighbourhood Environmental Committees were formed and became actively engaged with awareness raising. An Integrated Waste Treatment Facility was established for the first time (with facilities for sorting, treatment, incineration and disposal of waste) with two boreholes sunk for the benefit of the local communities. The State Urban Development Board (UDB) was reinvigorated and contracted as a PSP; offering an interesting model of public-private partnership for waste management.</p>
Efficiency	<p>58% of the total cost of the project was on consultancy (survey, diagnostic studies and design of the pilot project) while 36% was spent on capital (and 6% on other costs). However, it is not possible to state precisely whether the project has been value for money as the pilot was less than six months in operation when further support from SLGP came to a stop due to lack of commitment from the State Government.</p>

Impact	<p>The pilot had not developed sufficiently enough for its impact to be determined or judged with certainty. The Sanitation Bill was signed into law in March 2005 while the pilot project was launched in May 2005 and SLGP scaled down its support and finally withdrew from the State in December 2005. Although people believe that Makurdi town has become cleaner, there is insufficient baseline information on the volume of waste collected previously which would provide the basis to judge the change. Awareness was created on SWM, however the momentum is gradually fading away due to the limited achievements post December 2005.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Government must have the political will and demonstrate commitment beyond mere words to sustain such a reform initiative. Further, if private participation is to be effective, then the private service providers must also find profit in what they are doing. An enabling environment therefore has to be created for the PSPs to operate. The project was prematurely closed, therefore sustainability has been thwarted. As at July 2007 however, the Ministry of Water Resources and Environment licensed three additional PSPs to cover some zones outside the pilot which in effect means that private sector participation in solid waste management is the preferred option even by government and can be sustained given a favourable operational environment.</p>
<p>What lessons have been learned to inform future programme design? For government partners: <i>Political Support and Commitment to the project by Government</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress on service delivery reform will not be possible without political support at the highest level. A key indicator of commitment to reform in any sector is for State Government to ensure that it has a policy, strategy and action plan to address the problem. Benue had none of these in place at the outset of the project, and when they were developed with consultancy support they were not endorsed by Government • The lack of financial commitment from Government to this initiative exposed the limited appetite for reform; SLGP covered core PSP costs for several months and Government did not step in to take up its full responsibility following the withdrawal of SLGP support. <p><i>Public – Private Partnership</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In defining zones it is important to make sure of two things: a) that there is a balance of institutional and residential customers present, and b) to put in place a standing payment (to be authorised by the PS if possible) for those services which were provided to State institutional customers. With such a block payment relatively guaranteed it is possible for the private contractor to cover their direct operational costs. <p><i>Public Awareness and Participation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project relied on fundamental behavioural change from the street level upwards. A project of this kind must have a clear strategy for public awareness creation as well as a mechanism for effective community participation to ensure that people actively engage in the issue, rather than just passively receive information about it • Further, the sustained participation of the public is heavily influenced by their experience of receiving quality services 	



Institutional/Management

- There must be a transparent and thorough process of engaging PSPs, who must have sufficient capacity and capability to manage waste collection and disposal
- A capable General Manager of BENSESA is critical to the smooth running of the SWM programme as it is not a simple matter to administer this complex sector, especially in the context of behavioural change and wider reform processes
- The NECs are self-formed grassroots organisations, but consideration should be given to some form of seed funding to assist with basic secretarial materials, and once the NECs are established and functional, the option of forming co-operatives should be examined

Regulation and Control

- The performance of PSPs is heavily influenced by the performance and functionality of the government regulatory body
- Monitoring and audit protocols should be developed and included as part of the contractual agreement between government and PSPs before operations start
- Public complaints recording and response system should also be developed to provide a tool to monitor the performance of SWM services in terms of service coverage/quality and environmental impact
- Adequate enforcement structures must be in place to deal with defaulting customers who refuse to pay their tariffs – and a block payment should be put in place for State Government institutions

For donors:

- As with many other interventions, the SWM project in Benue was hampered by a lack of MoU between DFID and the State Government. An MoU which outlined what DFID would support through SLGP and what the Governor was committed to would have given a basis for negotiation when lack of commitment on the State Government side was perceived
- SWM projects take a considerable amount of time to implement requiring a wide range of skills and cannot therefore be a ‘quick win’ given their complexity
- The nature of the spend should be carefully considered to avoid dependence on the donor for what should be recurrent government costs – capital subsidy of vehicles and other removable assets should be avoided
- Reform in one part of government highlights weaknesses in other parts of the system which then need to be considered for technical and financial support; which is particularly pronounced in terms of a Ministry and its related parastatals

Further information

SLGP documentation:
 SLGP Consultants’ Reports

Key contact points:
 Andrew Gbakon, Ex-Technical Officer, SLGP Benue (now Independent Consultant)
 Terna Ahua, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources & Environment, Benue State
 Daniel Iorshagher, Director Environment and Chairman TWG, Environmental Management Steering Committee (EMSC), Benue State
 Sam Agwa, Lecturer, University of Agriculture Makurdi



Case Study 3 Solid Waste Management Pilot, FCT Abuja

Initiative	Solid Waste Management Project
Partner	Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB)
Starting point	<p>The Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) is responsible for waste management in FCTA. In 2003, AEPB was beset with financial, human and technical constraints that hindered its effectiveness; one of the results of which were waste dumps all over the city. In 2003, the agency started a pilot in three areas of the city, contracting private operators to collect waste, but even where services were delivered, people were not paying. AEPB was not able to collect payment for waste management services; there were problems with the distribution of bills, which was partial and based on inaccurate data. There was no comprehensive database capturing the number of households in Abuja. AEPB debt amounted to N400 million in 2004 and almost N600 million in 2005, and AEPB was dependent on government subventions. Another area of grave concern was the high level of corruption in the AEPB; the workforce was bloated with large numbers of absentee, incapable or ghost workers and the accounting system was very weak. The then Minister of the Federal Capital Territory wanted to take control of the problem, and decided to accelerate the involvement of the private sector.</p>
<p>Expected outcomes and outputs, and original theory of change</p> <p>Expected outcome:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A restructured and reformed waste management institution (AEPB) that would provide an example of improved service delivery to the Federal Capital Territory and its citizenry to encourage broader governance reform <p><i>Intermediate outcome:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government withdrawal from direct service provision (to accommodate the new way of thinking) to play a more strategic regulatory role <p>Expected outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two models of service delivery tested involving Public/Private Partnership (Contract Agreement) and Licensing Arrangement • A restructured and properly functioning waste management authority that was fit for its purpose, financially independent and self-sufficient • Cleaner streets <p>Theory of Change: A solid waste management pilot would serve as a model for better service planning and improved service delivery in the FCT. Solid waste management provided an excellent entry point into the larger arena of governance reform, and a visible practical initiative with which to engage. Lessons learnt could be directly transferable to other sectors.</p>	



Drivers of Change: Minister FCTA & Director AEPB

The initiative commenced in 2004

Process, activities and related events

Process:

In late 2003 SLGP held preliminary discussions with the Minister of FCT, and the Federal Minister of the Environment regarding sharing SWM lessons from the Enugu and Benue experiences. The Minister of FCT had created a Public-Private Partnership Unit in his office, and SWM was one of the first areas he wanted to address (it was decided that liquid waste would remain under the direct control of AEPB). A new and reform-minded Director of AEPB had been appointed. In early 2004, SLGP commissioned several consultancies on service delivery improvements in the pilots embarked upon by AEPB as well as support for the overhaul of the organisation. SLGP also supported the post of Project Officer in the PPP Unit, who was primarily engaged to manage AEPB reforms.

SLGP aimed to apply all its thematic areas of reform in AEPB: public financial management, service delivery improvement, civil service reform, policy and strategy and communications and transparency. The support included designing debt collection machinery and engaging a private revenue consultant, improvements in the monitoring of contractor performance, right-sizing of staff by developing standard and transparent criteria for the exercise, support for enumeration of buildings, households and businesses in the FCC; computerized billing system, linking the enumeration data to the billing system; outsourcing of bill distribution to DHL (a private courier company). All these activities were done with a view to enhancing service delivery and revenue generation. Funded by SLGP, the Convention on Business Integrity (CBI) also undertook a diagnostic study of AEPB with the objective of obtaining an overview of existing structure, processes and systems to determine management efforts and process improvements required to move the organisation to a level where sound and best practices would be implemented.

Having prepared the ground for further and enhanced public/private partnership for SWM in FCTA, contractors were invited to bid. The contractors were selected following an intensive transparent due process and engaged for a period of five years in the first instance, renewable based on performance. Several meetings with contractors to review progress were organised and attended by SLGP. SLGP withdrew support in December 2005.

AEPB is now involved in another pilot in some satellite towns through a licensing arrangement. In this context, the contractor is responsible for collecting its own revenue with AEPB support, and the contractor pays a licensing fee to AEPB. Recently, Cutec Institute of Germany was engaged as Project Advisers to AEPB. Cutec is helping to design integrated solid waste management system (ISWMS) and Sanitary Engineering Landfill site at Goza.

Activities and related events:

Jan 2004: Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Phase 2- Federal Capital Territory.

Jan 2004: Waste Management Rates/Charges Regulations produced

Feb 2004: Various Technical Guides for Solid Waste Management Input.

Mar 2004: Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Report 3 –Federal Capital Territory

Mar 2004: Waste Management Audit.



Jun 2004: Consultancy in Service Delivery Pilot for the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory.
 Mar 2005: The Convention on Business Integrity (CBI) Diagnostic Report on Abuja Environmental Protection Board (MFCT-AEPB)
 May 2005: Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Federal Capital Territory
 Jul 2005: Enumeration of Buildings and Housing Units in FCC: Data Transfer and Integration completed
 Dec 2005: Solid Waste Management.
 Dec 2005: SLGP's support to AEPB came to an end

Successes and achievements

Institutional

- AEPB has transformed from a dysfunctional and largely corrupt organisation into a functional regulatory unit. While there is still much to be achieved, the progress has been good especially in the context of Nigeria. The approach is being applied to the Water Board of FCTA (in particular, Billing System, Enumeration and Institutional Re-structuring)
- Successful public/private partnerships have been set up, with the contractors generally performing reasonably well
- The approach has been extended to satellite towns under licensing agreement, and including the involvement of Area Councils

Financial

- AEPB revenue has increased, and the agency is no longer receiving subventions from FCTA to deliver its services or to pay its contractors. The average monthly income is N45 million, though June 2007 was N73 million
- Corruption has been substantially reduced; AEPB is now operating against a much more accountable approach, and senior staff stated that the agency is "much more prudent than it used to be"
- More effective systems are in place for accounting and billing, including the distribution of bills. AEPB now has the capacity to bill 78,000 customers, up from 18,000 before the project, and many more customers are actually being billed

Personnel

- AEPB has been through a right-sizing exercise with no conflict with the unions, and the remaining staff are more committed

Environmental

- Abuja is becoming a very clean city by most standards, and is exceptional by sub-Saharan African standards

Shortcomings and challenges

Institutional

- Dealing with the politics and dynamics within the system was challenging, particularly when the initiative clashed with the self interest of those who had been benefiting from the previous status quo
- The extent of corruption in the system was underestimated, the existence of a number of cartels colluding with banks did not help matters
- A lot of the SLGP support to the initiative came in the form of individual back-stopping for the Director of AEPB, and more could have been done to support her, particularly in terms of management training
- Work on a waste management policy for FCTA was stalled by the Minister's Adviser on Environmental Health, who wanted to deal with this issue himself but did not progress it



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a sense of apprehension amongst the staff about being paid through internally generated revenue; but this has now dissipated <p><i>Working with the Private Sector</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a major problem settling on a monitoring and scoring system that was acceptable to both government and private sector partners, because the payment of the latter was dependent on the scoring <p><i>Instilling the Culture of Paying for Services</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Persuading Abuja residents to pay for services rendered is an ongoing task, the project had to work with magistrates to improve the system for dealing with those who do not pay their bills. Even for those who are willing to pay, the system is not very convenient and that still requires work 	
<p>Costs</p> <p>Consultancy: £21,687</p> <p>Capital (<i>sub-divided if it includes several expensive items</i>): Billing equipment and database: £22,382 Metro CitiServe – Mapping: £28,732 Sundry: £4,792</p> <p>TOTAL: £77,593</p> <p><i>Activity period primarily March 04 to Aug 04 (some consultancy through to Dec 05)</i></p>	
Relevance	<p>Relevance to Nigerian stakeholders (including State Governments) The project was important to ensure that Nigeria’s capital city was an acceptable entry point into the country. The idea was to make Abuja the cleanest city not only in Nigeria but also indeed throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Further, the project was relevant as an example of how change could be achieved in a corrupt and dysfunctional government agency, which was systematically reformed from all angles.</p> <p>Relevance to DFID, other donors and their programmes: The project provided an example of service delivery improvement; reforming a parastatal to deliver services more effectively. The approach to reform had been encouraged as a mechanism for achieving visible and rapid change to provide a model for more fundamental reform throughout government.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>The system of waste collection involving the public-private partnership in the FCT has been quite successful and effective. AEPB no longer relies on government for subventions (unlike some other Parastatals) to deliver its services. Residents and government as well as non-government establishments are now more willing to pay for services delivered and above all the city has become cleaner.</p>
Efficiency	<p>The spend on consultancies, billing equipment, database and mapping were quite low but with significantly higher output than expenditure, particularly in comparison with the pilot projects in Benue and Enugu.</p>



Impact	<p>The project has had a significant impact. More effective systems for accounting, billing and bill distribution have been established. Contractors are generally performing better. There is improved revenue generation and AEPB no longer receives a subvention from the Government. AEPB is earning on average N45 million a month, sometimes much more. The programme has been extended to satellite towns under licensing agreement and the involvement of Area Councils in solid waste management. Abuja is much cleaner now than it was in 2004. Further, the multi-dimensional approach to reform is being applied in the FCT Water Board under the DFID-funded Public Sector Reform programme.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Public/Private Partnership in Solid Waste Management in Abuja so far is a success story. The current public/private sector partnership can be sustained given a favourable operational environment devoid of political intrigues and considerations. Moreover, this pilot scheme is popular amongst government staff, contractors and Abuja residents. The key to sustainability is ensuring that AEPB truly embeds the reforms, without sliding back to previous bad practices. This is unlikely, largely because the thorny issues of tackling corruption were systematically addressed through the project. The signs are currently good regarding sustainability. AEPB has engaged the Cutec Institute from Germany in an advisory capacity. Cutec is helping to design integrated solid waste management system (ISWMS) and Sanitary Engineering Landfill site at Goza</p>
<p>What lessons have been learned to inform future programme design? For government partners: <i>Institutional</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High political support and commitment is essential to a project as this. The Minister gave tremendous support right from the start of the project • Strong management within the reforming agency is also critical to ensuring that the level of change required is pushed through, breaking the power of vested interests. This requires strength, dedication and courage • It is easy to underestimate the extent of corruption in such a situation, and how entrenched it is, in this case including criminal cartels colluding with banks <p><i>Public-Private Partnership</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Abuja, the model used was one of performance-related contracts for the contractors, who were not responsible for revenue collection. This put the onus on the government for managing revenue collection, leaving the contractors to do what they do best. The revenue system has to strike the right balance between covering costs and not billing at too high a level; this government is trying to manage • The licensing arrangement currently being piloted in the satellite towns must be carefully monitored and evaluated and lessons learnt before this can be rolled out to other states as this is not the same as the contracting arrangement in Abuja which has proved very successful. • A 5-year contract between government and contractor is too long a contractual period, 2-3 years should be considered adequate, and subject to review 	



Technical

- It is important to ensure that a good management system after disposal of waste is put in place for sorting and recycling
- A weighbridge should be mounted at the entrance to the landfill site for weighing solid waste that contractors bring in, and payment to such contractors should be according to the weight of the waste delivered at the disposal site.

Policy

- Waste management policy must link sufficiently to an integrated urban policy (and law), which needs to consider the issue of street trading (among other issues). Street traders are problematic for a waste management authority; they litter the streets and it is difficult to get revenue from them

Public Support

- Sensitisation and awareness raising are key areas especially when trying to change public behaviour, but use of the media is expensive for formal campaigns. Creative use of media coverage is a good strategy whenever there is a story to tell, but more importantly Neighbourhood Associations need to engage regularly with the regulatory agency

For donors:

The nature of external support

- This was a project initiated and entirely driven by AEPB with facilitation and support from SLGP. The SLGP financial inputs were relatively low for a high return
- It is important to remember that the drivers of a reform initiative, in this case the Director of AEPB, require support as well as the organisational processes themselves. Senior management individuals are critical to the success of such reform efforts, and this should be overtly recognised in the design of the intervention, as they may require individual support
- Such a project always takes longer, costs more and is more difficult than is originally envisaged. However, where structured, whole system reform is undertaken, it can lead to tangible benefits. In FCTA all the problem areas were addressed.

Sustaining and deepening reform

- The Licensing Agreement Model embarked upon for satellite towns ought to be closely monitored and supported by the donors, as this may be successful as well. This model stipulates that the contractor would be responsible for collecting its own revenue with AEPB support and pay a licensing fee. If it works, it means that it is possible to run two models in one city based on socio-economic divide.

Further information

SLGP documentation:
Consultants' Reports

Key contact points:
Kosamat Bolaji Anibilowo (Director/CEO Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB),
Joe Abah (Ex- NEEDS Adviser)

Other relevant bodies of information:
DFID OPR of SLGP, September 2006

Annex 2

Relevant Documentation Reviewed

Solid Waste Management Pilot, Enugu

1. Solid Waste Management Improvement Pilot Project Enugu City. Lynne Barratt and Innocent Diyoke. February 2003
2. Service Delivery Improvements Pilot Enugu. Lynne Barratt.
3. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu. Lynne Barratt & Greg Anyaegbudike. June 2004
4. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu. Lynne Barratt and Greg Anyaegbudike. January 2005.
5. Solid Waste Management Improvement Training in Enugu. Kenneth Westlake. May 2005.
6. Issue Based Projects: Lesson Learning Review of Enugu Solid Waste Management Pilot. Philippa Haden and Daniel Ugwu. June 2005.
7. Drafting of Enugu State Environmental Protection Bill. Chinedu Eze and Emmanuel Onyeabor. December 2005.
8. Enugu Landfill Management Review. James C Nwafor. April 2006.
9. Eswama Financial System Improvement. Sam Onov Onyia. September 2006.
10. Waste Management: Review of Sensitisation Campaign. Daniel S. Ugwu. October 2006.

Solid Waste Management Pilot, Benue

1. Preliminary Environmental Assessment (Desk Study) of Benue State. Hassan Bdliya and Anongo Lyam. February 2002.
2. Poverty/Environmental Linkages for Benue State Reform Team. Barratt, Lyam and Bdliya. May 2002
3. Documentation of Available Information on the Solid Waste Situation in Nigeria: A Case Study of Benue and Enugu States. Rufus Sha'Ato and Patrick C. Ikor. June 2003
4. Development of an Integrated Urban Solid Waste Management Programme for Benue State. Andrew Whiteman, Rufus Sha'Ato, Anongo Lyam, Lynne Barratt. October 2003.



5. Survey of the Solid Waste Situation in Makurdi Urban Area. Rufus Sha'Ato, Sylvester Y Aboho, Felix O Oketunde. November 2003.
6. Physical Survey of the Pilot Project Area in the Makurdi Urban Area and Development of a Solid Waste Management Customer Database. Anongo Lyam. December 2003.
7. Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Programme, Pilot Project Design Final Report. Andrew Whiteman, Rufus Sha'Ato and Anongo Lyam. January 2004.
8. Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Project Review: Draft Report. Andrew Whiteman. March 2004.
9. Consultancy in Public Awareness and Service Delivery Improvement Pilots. Steve Crawhurst. April 2004.
10. Willingness to pay in Makurdi Solid Waste Management Pilot Project Area. August 2004
11. Public Awareness and Participation in Makurdi Solid Waste Management Pilot Project. December 2004
12. Environmental Impact Assessment of the Proposed Integrated Waste Treatment Facility for Makurdi. University of Agriculture Makurdi Consult. June 2005
13. Support to Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Programme. Andrew Whiteman. July 2005
14. BISWMP: Support to Strategy Development and Institutional Restructuring Consultant. Andrew Gbakon. August 2005
15. Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Programme (BISWMP): Facilitation of Neighbourhood Environmental Committees, Operational Guidelines for Integrated Waste Treatment and Development of Monitoring/Enforcement Indicators and Protocols. Samuel Agwa. September 2005

Solid Waste Management Pilot, FCT Abuja

1. Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Phase 2- Federal Capital Territory. Lynne Barratt. January 2004
2. Various Technical Guides for Solid Waste Management Input. Lynne Barratt. February 2004.
3. Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Report 3 –Federal Capital Territory. Lynne Barratt. March 2004.
4. Waste Management Audit. Simon Gusah. March 2004



Slgp

5. Consultancy in Service Delivery Pilot for the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory. Lynne Barratt. June 2004.
6. Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement Pilots Federal Capital Territory. Lynne Barratt. May 2005.
7. Solid Waste Management. Lynne Barratt. December 2005.

Annex 3

List of persons met

<i>Persons met with</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
LLR Team (Andrew Gbakon & Dele Thomas), Brian Kerr (SLGP Programme Manager), Shedrack Nkoro (SLGP Programme Officer) Enugu	Briefing and identification of documents on SWM to be used in the LLR exercise
Dele Thomas met with Uche Ani (Managing Director ESWAMA), Chijioke Agu (Permanent Secretary Ministry of Environment)	Discussion of the Enugu State Solid Waste Management Programme as a study case
Andrew Gbakon interviewed Mrs. W.N. Okeke (former Managing Director ESWAMA)	Discussion of the Enugu State Solid Waste Management Programme as a study case
Andrew Gbakon met with Angie Roques, State Team Leader PATHS	Clinical waste management
LLR Team (Philippa Haden, Andrew Gbakon & Dele Thomas) met with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Joseph Abonyi, President, Awkunanaw Neighbourhood Association o Nnaji Ifeoma Victoria, rep. Worldwide Network o Andrew Monye, Director, Mother Earth Preservation Services Ltd o Chidi B. Ohia Chairman, CIBRON Co. Nig o Emeka I. Oko, State Coordinator, ESWAMA Waste Materials o Rex Anum represented Chairman, Enugu North LGA 	Discussion of the Enugu State Solid Waste Management Programme as a study case (Participants from Civil Society, PSPs, ESWAMA and Local Government)
LLR Team (PH, AG, DT) met with Brian Kerr (SLGP Programme Manager), Shedrack Nkoro (SLGP Enugu)	Discussion of the Enugu State Solid Waste Management Programme as a study case
LLR Team met with John Sanchez (Ex-Programme Manager, SLGP Enugu and currently, SLGP Coordinator Abuja)	Discussion of the Enugu State Solid Waste Management Programme
PH met with Alan Griffiths (Finance & Admin Manager, Abuja)	Presentation of costs of SWM activities
LLR Team met Joe Abah (Ex- NEEDS Adviser), current Programme Coordinator, PRS	Discussion on Abuja Solid Waste Pilot
LLR Team met Kosamat Bolaji Anibilowo (Director/CEO Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB)	Overview/Discussion on Abuja Solid Waste Pilot