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**SLGP Lesson Learning Report 902**  
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**Issue Based Projects: Lesson Learning Review of Enugu  
Solid Waste Management Pilot**

by

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## Acronyms

A2J	Access to Justice Programme (now SJG)
DFID	Department for International Development
ENSEPA	Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency
ESRT	Enugu State Reform Team
ESWAMA	Enugu State Waste Management Authority
HoD	Head of Department
IBP	Issues-Based Project
MD	Managing Director
NGO	Non Government Organisation
PATHS	Partnership for Transforming Health Systems
PSP	Private Sector Provider
SJG	Security, Justice & Growth Programme
SLGP	State and Local Government Programme
ToRs	Terms of Reference



## 1.0 SUMMARY

The solid waste management project has been successful in addressing a series of complex challenges associated with public sector reform. The change agenda has been sustained throughout the two and a half year lifespan of the project to date with significant results in terms of legislative change, institutional reform and the acceptance of the public-private partnership model for service delivery.

The lessons emerging from the project are not solid waste specific. They form a set of service delivery improvement lessons that could be applied to other sectors and thematic areas.

The project was conceived as a service delivery improvement pilot; which has come to be considered as an example of an issues based project. If judged against its own original six stated criteria, the project would be regarded as partially successful. Areas of greatest strength would be around the facets of public sector reform and involvement of the private sector, with limited progress on involving civil society, linking environmental management and public health and encouraging connections between various layers of government. The ultimate agenda of improving service delivery is yet to be realised on a significant scale though all the core components to achieve this are in place.

If looked at through the lens of an issues-based approach, the project would be most constrained by the lack of popular force for change on this particular issue. The real momentum for change behind this project came from within government, typified by the solid support of the initiative from the Governor throughout. Though the previous waste management agency ENSEPA was extremely unpopular and the need for reform in waste management widely and clearly recognized in Enugu, the project has not benefited from, or capitalized on an emerging 'popular force for change'. The project has focused on the technical and on the institutional aspects of reform, at the expense of adequately considering social and behavioral issues.

The pilot demonstration model in New Haven failed for a variety of reasons, but gave the project significant "traction" to really engage with the core of institutional reform. SLGP and the Governor were committed publicly to the process of improving solid waste management, and New Haven provided salutary lessons in terms of procurement, contracting and infrastructure development.

The key areas of positive lesson learning have been around legislative reform, the dissolution of a corrupt parastatal, the creation of a new agency with a leaner mandate, and human resource management examples for government. Encouraging transparency and accountability have been an underlying theme of the project and have been reflected through every contractual or recruitment process that the project has supported. Further, the widespread acceptance of the role of government as regulator rather than as direct service provider is significant, with the wholesale contracting out of solid waste collection in Enugu town.

In terms of negative lesson learning, insufficient thought was given to the technical model applied to New Haven, and indeed to the scoping of the entire undertaking. Partially as a result, documentation of the project was limited in terms of monitoring against a predetermined design; it was a project that developed without reference to a framework. Further, not enough space was given to the role of various forms of civil society bodies in achieving reform: critical in a process that is utterly dependent on the payment of service delivery charges by the end user; the people of Enugu.

In order to capitalize on the gains already made by the project, it is recommended that SLGP remains committed to the process of reform within ESWAMA over the next year. SLGP attention should focus on particular aspects of nurturing the privatization model, encouraging reform of public expenditure management, and enhancing the engagement of ESWAMA with the public. Finally, it is necessary for SLGP and DFID to consider how to respond to the needs of the Ministry of Environment, which has been considerably impacted upon by the project, particularly in terms of highlighting its own requirements. None of these interventions need necessarily be expensive. They require careful thought and planning with ESWAMA specifically, and a sustained management oversight.

The project has highlighted a series of generic lessons, which can inform future project design:

***Scoping, Start Up & Timescale:***

- a) High level political support is essential to a project such as this which inevitably touches on core governance issues before long
- b) The technical feasibility of an issue needs to be carefully considered before embarking on a project of this nature, particularly in the light of the political support that high level support will inevitably bring to 'show results'
- c) A "quick win" is a naïve hope: the processes take time

***Engaging with Institutional Reform***

- d) The pilot provided the entry to serious institutional reform issues
- e) Legislative reform can provide the basis for tackling ongoing institutional issues
- f) Risks in relation to human resource management (retrenchment and recruitment) can pay significant dividends
- g) Institutional reform is multi-faceted and must be approached as such
- h) Reform in one part of government highlights weaknesses in other parts of the system

***Private Sector & Public Support***

- i) Support for privatization needs to be carefully managed with consistent input into monitoring its progress as well as listening to emerging problems
- j) Lack of emphasis on social and behavioural issues has been a constraint and is an ongoing area of need

***Extent of Commitment Required***

- k) SLGP, or any other external agent, needs to consider the extent of time and resources required for these initiatives and not underestimate these factors

## **2.0 INTRODUCTION**

The objective of the consultancy was to review and document the lessons to date from the project on solid waste management, and to produce a document that could inform the delivery of other Issue Based Projects (IBPs). The consultants were tasked to examine “how SLGP has attempted to use a small pilot to chip away at bigger institutional problems, such as poor public expenditure management, poor human resource management, image and communication, community involvement, private sector involvement and consultation”. This report describes what the project was intended to achieve, how far it has met its objectives to date, lessons that have been learnt, activities that have gone well that could be used to inform other IBPs, and elements that have been less successful that should be avoided in other IBPs.

The report is structured as follows. Section 3 describes the methodology for the consultancy. Section 4 outlines the extent of original project intention that was documented, and provides some commentary on this within the context of the overall SLGP monitoring framework. Section 5 gives a summary of the project history. Section 6 encapsulates the lessons learned in two parts, one generic and one SLGP-specific. Section 7 provides recommendations. Annex 1 presents a consultation list of all those met during the review, and Annex 2 lists the documentation reviewed. Annex 3 provides a summary of project cost to date, and Annex 4 presents the project within the context of the proposed monitoring and evaluation template format for SLGP.

## **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

Dr Daniel Ugwu and Philippa Haden carried out the review over a period of 9 days in Enugu (24<sup>th</sup> May – 1<sup>st</sup> June 2005). The consultants held interviews with SLGP staff, ESWAMA staff, government officials, private sector contractors, NGOs, and members of the public. The consultants also visited the landfill site at Ugwuaji, observed the official Sanitation Day activities on 28<sup>th</sup> May 2005 including the related Environmental Court prosecution process, and visited the New Haven pilot area.

The consultants reviewed the consultancy reports commissioned by SLGP throughout the period of the initiative to date (early 2003 – mid 2005), and scanned the relevant SLGP files for further information.

## **4.0 THE PROJECT MONITORING FRAMEWORK**

### **4.1 Lack of Project Framework**

The review has been constrained by the fact that the Solid Waste Management project was not systematically defined and described at the outset in terms of envisaged outcomes, and indicators with which to measure them. A recent SLGP report on monitoring and evaluation highlights the problems of lack of initial documentation; “to avoid anachronistic judgements the IBP or theme needs to be assessed in its own terms ... this is why making the baseline, theory of change and context explicit at the start is so important”. While it is understood that this project *became* an IBP (see Section 4.2 below) and therefore should not be judged harshly in retrospect in these terms, the lack of overarching documentation remains problematic for reviewing any kind of intervention. This is not to say that the project has not been monitored: narrative reporting of progress was included in the overarching SLGP quarterly reporting to DFID. Detailed activity monitoring was also maintained both through consultancy inputs and through a monitoring format listing component parts of the project and related activities, initiated in May 2003 by an international consultant. However, a framework was not designed to capture the level above activity monitoring which would have provided a useful analytical basis for capturing lessons and monitoring progress or lack of progress against original intentions. As a result the review team has attempted to reconstruct the story of the pilot including eliciting the theory of change that underlined it, in order to set the lessons learnt within the right context.

### **4.2 Shifting Definitions**

Although the Terms of Reference for the review term the pilot to be an ‘Issue Based Project’ (IBP), at the time of its conceptualisation it was regarded as a ‘Service Delivery Improvement Pilot’. Specifically, the Pilot was designed to do the following:

- Improve service delivery by providing a cleaner and healthier environment
- Involve civil society in awareness raising and monitoring service delivery
- Involve the private sector in partnership with the government
- Involve different tiers of government in service delivery and improve their coordination
- Tackle the issues of public expenditure management, human resource management, image management and revenue generation, and
- Draw the links between environmental management and public health

By October 2003, when the Inception Review of SLGP took place, it was clear that the pilot on solid waste management was providing a “useful basis for the issue based reform approach”<sup>1</sup>. The shift in language from service delivery improvement pilot to issue based project is important in terms of the explicit IBP emphasis on political coalitions and support for change as opposed to the service delivery improvement emphasis on practical impact to build momentum for change. The essence of governance reform motivating both concepts is the same. In effect, in time, the Solid Waste Management Pilot became an IBP. As described in SLGP documentation<sup>2</sup>, an IBP has the following objectives:

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<sup>1</sup> SLGP Enugu Programme Management Presentation to the Inception Review team, October 2003

<sup>2</sup> Issues-Based Projects (IBPs) Definition and Guidelines for Selection, updated SLGP project memorandum



- Improvement initiatives in selected services, including the service of providing an environment for investment and growth;
- Through these projects to bring pressure upon the variety of institutional barriers to improvement, systematically raising and breaking down these barriers in the limited arena of the project;
- Mobilise sufficient public interest so as to present a popular force for change through the service or growth issue being dealt with; and
- Publicise the project, the barriers to its success that are being raised, and the achievements in breaking down those barriers, widening acceptance of new ways and standards and encouraging similar changes in others

As a result of the shift from service delivery improvement into issue based reform, and of the lack of a specific monitoring framework, this review has attempted to structure the lessons emerging from the project on elements of public sector reform issues as outlined in the ToRs. In order to set the context for the lessons, a summary of key milestones in the project history is provided in Section 5.

## 5.0 SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT HISTORY

Following an SLGP supported study tour to South Africa in 2002; members of the Environment and Discipline sub-group of the Enugu State Reform Team (ESRT) put forward a proposal to SLGP for a service delivery improvement pilot relating to solid waste management<sup>3</sup>. As reported by SLGP in January 2003, though the proposal contained some technical weaknesses, it had potential to be the first of the service delivery improvement pilots<sup>4</sup>. It would have a visible impact on the environment and health of Enugu urban dwellers while also illustrating and developing governance reform issues. It would allow for departmental capacity to be investigated and strengthened (the Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency, ENSEPA). It would involve the development of a public/private sector initiative, raise issues concerning assessments of service delivery performance relative to current financial allocations (to feed into Public Expenditure Management reform work), and it would provide opportunities for synergy between DFID programmes (the then A2J and PATHS). Critically, the proposal provided the opportunity for SLGP to engage with ESRT on tangible issues, which the programme was under considerable pressure to do.

An international consultant reviewed the proposal in February 2003, and a way forward was charted to support areas for immediate intervention, and investigate others further. In the absence of an SLGP Programme Manager for Enugu, the international consultant and a local consultant were tasked with taking the process forward. Early priority actions focused on the clean up of the Enugu town landfill site, and the establishment of a pilot project site in the New Haven area. The pilot included contracting NGOs to carry out sensitisation and awareness raising (increasingly linked to the activity at New Haven as the project progressed), and provision of collection bins, push trucks and transfer stations. Further, ENSEPA was to contract a Private Sector Provider (PSP) to carry out the waste removal from the transfer stations to the landfill site.

<sup>3</sup> ENSEPA had designed the proposal submitted to SLGP. The basis of the proposal was the privatisation of waste collection.

<sup>4</sup> In Enugu and other SLGP states, quick win proposals had tended to focus on supply-side capacity building measures such as training, provision of computers and other equipment, and study tours, all for government departments and staff. SLGP recognised that such pilots did little to demonstrate the potential impact of reform on service delivery and hence it had been decided that the programme would invest in “quick wins” to demonstrate tangible reform.



The arrival of a new SLGP Programme Manager for Enugu in May 2003 significantly increased the tempo of the project. During the process to date it had become increasingly clear that the project action plan was not supported by a strategy or a policy. As a result SLGP convened strategy and financial planning workshops in June 2003, bringing together personnel from both Benue and Enugu. These sessions underlined the need for fundamental institutional change, particularly in terms of the need for the establishment of a new solid waste management authority under the Ministry of Environment. A whole swathe of related human resource management and public expenditure management issues had been highlighted. Immediately following the workshops, a draft Solid Waste Management Strategy for Enugu was developed (and finalised in December 2003).

A Revenue and Expenditure Tracking study of ENSEPA in October 2003<sup>5</sup> revealed the extent of weakness in the financial management system of the agency and the need for restructuring and reorganisation of the Accounts Department of ENSEPA. Further, and more fundamentally, the project supported the drafting of a new Waste Management Authority Bill as recommended in the Strategy highlighted above. The process lasted several months, with a new law promulgated in July 2004. The law set the basis for a whole series of interconnected reform activity related to structure, staffing and management of the new ESWAMA.

In the meantime, the development and operation of the landfill site and the New Haven pilot had continued, beset with delays and difficulties relating to PSP contractors, land acquisition for transfer stations and with the model itself in terms of its practical operation. Most importantly, by mid 2004 it was clear that drastic change was required, “waste is not being removed by anybody and it continues to build up in the streets – including the New Haven Pilot site. The fact that [the pilot] did not work must not be viewed as failure for the lessons learnt are not only applicable in Enugu but elements have been shared with the implementing and executing organisations in Abuja and Benue”<sup>6</sup>.

The appointment of a new Managing Director of ESWAMA on a performance-related contract by 1<sup>st</sup> September 2004 was the first in a series of radical changes relating to human resource management. A recruitment process for the new Heads of Department for the organisation followed (three out of five HoDs appointed on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2004 and they are also on performance-related contracts). There was also a significant staff retrenchment exercise to cut down on the bloated inefficiency of the ENSEPA model (119 voluntary redundancies agreed in December 2004 out of a total of 379 staff). Further, in late 2004, an open tender process was initiated, to contract out the collection of waste by PSPs for the zones of Enugu metropolis. The process was national and it drew upon lessons learned during the pilot phase relating to competitive tendering. The process included a training exercise with the selected PSPs in recognition of the fact that privatisation on this scale for Enugu was a new and experimental exercise for all parties. The Governor officially launched ESWAMA in January 2005.

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<sup>5</sup> Revenue and Expenditure Tracking, Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency, Chinedu Eze & Patrick Okonji, October 2003

<sup>6</sup> Consultancy in Solid Waste Management Improvement Enugu, Lynne Barratt & Greg Anyaegbudike, June 2004

SLGP continues to provide support to the reform process, though on a much-reduced budget. Project support has gradually moved away from infrastructure and capital investment into focusing on the 'softer' elements of the process. Indications for sustainability are tentatively good; though the fledgling ESWAMA and the nascent PSP arrangements are still vulnerable and require continued support from SLGP.

## **6.0 LESSONS LEARNED**

### **6.1 Lessons for all stakeholders engaged in reform**

#### **6.1.1 Entry point & political will**

- Waste was a visible issue about which there was widespread dissatisfaction in Enugu. The waste authority in the form of ENSEPA embodied all of the problems of a corrupt, overstaffed parastatal, and was extremely unpopular. Further, there was no vested political interest in maintaining the status quo of ENSEPA. Therefore the situation presented a logical entry point for a service delivery improvement pilot.
- The consistent support of the Governor throughout the solid waste management process has been fundamental to the extent and depth of reform achieved to date. Further, this activity has been carried out in the broader context of Enugu state government reforms in public expenditure management and civil service reform.

#### **6.1.2 Learning from a failed pilot**

- The pilot demonstration model for solid waste management in New Haven failed. It was heavy on infrastructure, expensive and inefficient and as a result it was not replicable. The model should have been more rigorously reviewed from a technical perspective. However, having embarked upon it, the importance of the pilot lay in the series of lessons learned through the engagement with both contractors and ENSEPA. The lessons related to a swathe of difficulties around achieving effective transparent procurement for engineering contracts, and around maintaining rigorous contract management. Early SLGP attempts to avoid corruption, fraud and breach of contract were insufficient, with contractors defaulting, carrying out sub-standard work and taking months to do jobs that should have entailed weeks. SLGP rapidly moved into a mode of tightly controlled procurement procedures in an attempt to close the loopholes. In so doing, the project started to set standards as an example for reform in service delivery. Bids had to be delivered on time or were discarded, tenders were opened in public. Successful contractors had to provide insurance bonds and later bank guarantees to give SLGP some provision against defaulting, and were required to participate in an incentive and penalty scheme for delivery.

#### **6.1.3 Moving into the arena of institutional reform**

- The high profile of the New Haven initiative, which had been launched by the Governor, ensured that there was significant momentum for change. The negative aspect of this level of political endorsement was that the project was under serious pressure to deliver results, including pressure to roll out a model that was proving to be untenable on any scale. A key lesson here relates to the importance of scoping before seeking political endorsement. Scoping should include technical feasibility and highlight related institutional issues.



- Drafting the Enugu State Waste Management Authority Law provided the opportunity to set the legal boundaries for institutional reform, streamlining the functions of ENSEPA into a clearly defined waste management authority ESWAMA, reporting to the Ministry of Environment. A carefully considered piece of legislation provided the framework for a reformed organisation. However, the process of implementing the law entails ongoing organisational transformation from ENSEPA into ESWAMA. The change is multi-faceted, and requires careful monitoring and support to ensure that the process stays on track. ESWAMA has a smaller role but a bigger task with the primary function of regulation rather than direct service provision.
- The ongoing friction between ESWAMA and the Ministry of the Environment is largely the result of power dynamics. Although ESWAMA is under the supervision and nominal management of the Ministry, in reality ESWAMA reports directly to the Governor. The Ministry needs to focus on its own needs and support the evolution of ESWAMA. It is clear that the reform of one organisation has highlighted needs in relation to other parts of the system. The Ministry of the Environment faces new challenges in relation to its re-designated areas of operation, and related human resource needs, and the effective implementation of its incomplete strategy. The Ministry is facing considerable challenges, and is not currently fulfilling its own functions. It does not have the capacity to supervise ESWAMA.
- The recruitment process of the Managing Director of ESWAMA has provided a unique example for the state government. Experience and competence were valued above political inclination in the selection of the individual, and the contract was performance related, including indicators for monitoring progress. Following this example, the Governor sought SLGP advice on other recruitment processes including the Head of the Water Board. Further, the subsequent retrenchment exercise in ESWAMA, achieved without any problems with the unions, has provided the first demonstration of streamlining bloated state agencies. The process of retrenchment was consultative and careful, following a clear set of criteria that were agreed in advance.
- The work on image and communications has contributed to ensuring that ESWAMA has not assumed the very negative mantle of ENSEPA. Alone, this activity would not have achieved its purpose, but in combination with other activity the re-branding (change of name, renovation to buildings, visibility and action on Sanitation Days, uniforms, hotline establishment, radio communications and community outreach) fed into a whole suite of changes.
- Good public expenditure management is the single most important element of effective service delivery and the area of most obvious need for ongoing work. The importance of PEM in relation to waste management is highlighted by the fact that it has become clear that ESWAMA has the potential to become largely self-financing in the long term, through the financial model of PSP licensing.

#### **6.1.4 Private Sector Partnership**

- Much learning has been gained through the pilot process about interaction with the private sector and about the capability of Enugu's private solid waste management operators. The national tendering process carried out in late 2004 and subsequent allocation of PSPs to zones in Enugu town has revealed that capacity of the PSPs is not just limited within Enugu, but in Nigeria as a whole. It is evident that the private sector requires support and training just as government does.
- It has also become clear that ESWAMA needs to play a balancing act between strong monitoring of the PSPs, whilst at the same time being responsive to their problems. Lessons from a similar process in Abuja highlight the importance of tightly controlled monitoring to ensure that the required standards are maintained. However, this needs to be combined with a degree of flexibility on both sides, as the relationship between 'regulator' and 'implementers' develop. The successful operation of the PSPs is key to the new model of service delivery and the process of privatisation requires ongoing support to both sides.
- ESWAMA's duties cover the state, while the PSPs are only currently operating in the city. This means that the model operating in Enugu town contrasts directly with the work of ESWAMA elsewhere. While the PSP model cannot be extended until it is fully operational and successful in the urban context, this is an important issue to bear in mind for planning and budgeting for the future.

#### **6.1.5 Civil Society Involvement**

- NGOs have been involved to a limited extent in the project, primarily as sub contracted bodies for public sensitisation for the New Haven pilot. The lack of a baseline on people's attitudes, knowledge and practices regarding waste management has made it almost impossible to assess what the impact of sensitisation has been, and to assess specific gaps that need to be filled.
- However, it is clear that there has been a gap in terms of the project's structured interaction with civil society. In the longer term it is important to consider two issues:
  - Firstly, how messages on solid waste management can be absorbed at the local level beyond one-off NGO campaigns. An area for consideration would be enhancing ESWAMA's ongoing interaction with schools and churches, in an attempt to ensure sustained institutional connections.
  - Secondly, how community based organisations, such as Neighbourhood Associations, can monitor the performance of both PSPs and ESWAMA, ensuring that the client of a new service provision model has a voice in ensuring that service is adequate.
- The environmental court has become an instrument of prosecution for ESWAMA, though it can also be a mechanism for citizen's redress. In order to achieve this dual role, the court would need to be autonomous. The citizens need to be sensitised to know that they have the right to seek redress through the environmental court.

### **6.1.6 Project Impact**

- It is too soon to judge the impact of the project in terms of environmental health; the ESWAMA PSP model has simply not been up and running for long enough to judge the change in solid waste collection and disposal (and it is questionable whether there is sufficient baseline information on volume of waste being collected which would provide the basis from which to judge the expected change). It is clear that the landfill site is being much more effectively managed, but it is not clear whether the management of solid waste throughout Enugu town is more effective; either from a technical perspective, or a public perception perspective. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people believe that the town is now a cleaner place, but discussions in New Haven with a group of residents from a range of areas in town revealed a very mixed picture in terms of waste management and perceptions of improvement or lack thereof.

## **6.2 Lessons for SLGP**

### **6.2.1 Effective management support for an 'Issues Based Project'**

- SLGP has played a wide variety of roles from project management of engineering interventions, to the sourcing of specialist technical support in a variety of areas, to the facilitation of complex and delicate change processes. This latter area requires most management skill. Further, the balance between 'doing' and 'facilitating' needs constant managing.

### **6.2.2 Human resource requirements**

- SLGP human resource inputs have been high in terms of management, administration, and consultancy, though these have tapered to some extent as the nature of the SLGP support has moved away from physical infrastructure aspects of solid waste management into the institutional change areas. However, it is important to note that though support for institutional change may require less investment (capital and consultancy) it requires a high degree of management oversight and engagement. Further, the results are less visible. As a result of the intensity of demands of a single project, there is a danger of SLGP staff being spread too thinly and not adequately addressing the emerging challenges.
- In terms of synergy with other DFID programmes, there is potential which has been initially explored in terms of dealing with clinical waste issues with the PATHS programme, and in terms of engaging with Neighbourhood Associations through the community policing initiative of the SJG programme. Both will require SLGP dedicated staff time to ensure that they remain on the cross-programme agenda, or to take the lead when programme priorities are not in synchronicity. In relation to this latter point, it is acknowledged that what may be a priority for one programme is not necessarily a priority for another, which the example of clinical waste has clearly shown.



- The establishment of a core team of trusted professional consultants as project ‘advisers’ covering a range of skills has been essential. This has included coverage of engineering, legal matters, institutional development and human resource management as well as environmental management. A balance of international and local consultancy has been utilised for the project to good effect, though it must be said that specialist knowledge of solid waste management has been the weakest area of input, which would have challenged the original ENSEPA model more closely, and potentially avoided some of the pilot problems.
- The more local skill that SLGP can draw upon, the better, both in terms of understanding the local context, and rapidity of response to emerging issues. There have been phases of the project requiring day to day problem solving, for which international consultancy is simply not appropriate.

### **6.2.3 The importance of recording the process**

- The limited degree of project monitoring that has taken place has not only constrained review (and will hamper evaluation), but also represents a missed opportunity in terms of using process monitoring as a management tool. The formats for IBP documentation are now clearer and more structured. The most important element of monitoring relates to capturing the elements of process change that the project entails.

### **6.2.4 Longevity of commitment**

- There has been a clear benefit from continued commitment to a complex and at times conflict-ridden process, particularly in terms of learning from failure and continuing to pursue reform in partnership with the government agencies concerned. There is a sense that all parties are staying the course, actively seeking solutions to the barriers that continue to arise. In this case the pilot represented the opposite of a ‘quick win’ in terms of achieving immediate gains in service delivery, rather it indicated just how complicated reform would be. Working through the lessons of the pilot has strengthened the model that has emerged. However, the project did achieve a ‘quick win’ in the sense that the project represented an opportunity for engagement with the reform agenda, raising state government interest in SLGP as a mechanism for reform. For a long time, this was the only practical project with which SLGP was involved in Enugu.

## **7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

In terms of learning from the project, the following summary provides a checklist for future programme design, and should be considered as such:

- That high level political support is essential to a project such as this which inevitably touches on core governance issues before long
- That the technical feasibility of an issue needs to be carefully considered before embarking on a project of this nature, particularly in the light of the political pressure that high level support will inevitably bring to ‘show results’
- That in terms of improving services from inefficient and bloated government agencies a ‘quick win’ is a naïve hope: these processes take time and reveal why reform has not been achieved before now



- The pilot provided the entry to serious institutional reform issues, and the public nature of the SLGP and Governor's commitment to the pilot gave the project the required 'traction' to engage with reform
- That legislative reform can provide the basis for tackling ongoing institutional issues
- That taking risks in relation to human resource management both in terms of retrenchment and recruiting can pay significant dividends when done with due process to set an example for change with other government agencies
- That institutional reform is multi-faceted and requires tackling a whole series of issues to achieve real change
- That reform in one part of government highlights weaknesses in other parts of the system which then need to be considered for support in their own right
- That the lack of emphasis on social and behavioural issues in relation to the project has been a constraint to its success and is an ongoing area of need
- That support for a privatisation model needs to be managed carefully with consistent inputs into monitoring its progress, as well as listening to emerging problems
- That SLGP, or any other external agent, needs to consider just how time and resource intensive these processes are, requiring a wide range of skills and a consistency of oversight, as well as a longevity of commitment

The current SLGP programme has only a year left to run on a declining budget. However, it is recommended that SLGP continue to stay involved with ESWAMA's development, facilitating and supporting change. The following specific recommendations for SLGP are an attempt to highlight the key areas requiring ongoing support:

- The nascent privatized PSP model requires continued SLGP support. SLGP should play the following roles:
  - Ensure effective communication between all parties,
  - Act as a moderator in negotiations,
  - Support the capacity of the PSPs and
  - Facilitate effective control by ESWAMA particularly through supporting the ongoing monitoring element of the agency's work.

These interventions are not necessarily costly; rather they require consistency of engagement by SLGP staff.

- In order to ensure the institutionalization of reform of public expenditure management in ESWAMA, SLGP should support the Head of Finance (and the Accountant and the Auditor) in responding to needs as identified in the long overdue process of reform in this area;
- Possible support to the Ministry of Environment should be considered with DFID in order to address some of the 'knock on' institutional effects of reforming ESWAMA. This could enhance work that has already been undertaken by DFID, and to a lesser extent SLGP, on supporting the Ministry in terms of its strategy and human resource requirements;



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- ESWAMA requires support to engage the public effectively. ESWAMA is already linking into school and church groups; this work needs to be carried out on a significant scale, and further strengthened by linkages with community groups such as Neighbourhood Associations;
- Monitoring of IBPs should include both partners in the initiative, ie in this case both ESWAMA and SLGP, to ensure that process monitoring is a part of ongoing management.

## Annex 1

### List of People Met

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**SLGP:**

Neil Orchardson, Programme Co-ordinator, Abuja  
Joe Abah, ex-Programme Manager, Enugu  
Mark Smith, Programme Manager, Enugu  
Greg Anyaegbudike, Project Assistant, Enugu

**ESWAMA:**

Winifred Okeke, Managing Director  
Kenn Okey Anyaji, HoD, Solid and Liquid Waste Dept

**Enugu State Government:**

Sir Sam Umesie, Commissioner MoC&I (then PS Ministry of Environment)  
Abel Chukwu, Speaker Enugu State House of Assembly  
Chinedu Onu, Commissioner for Environment  
Mr Oha, Accountant General  
Mr Okwor, Head of Service  
Martin Ilo, Economic Adviser to Enugu State Government

**DFID:**

Kevin Gager, Enugu State Co-ordinator

**SJG:**

Paul Chionuma, Senior Programme Officer

**Consultants:**

Lynne Barratt, Environmental Consultant  
Innocent Diyoke, Engineer  
Chinedu Eze, Lawyer and Accountant

**NGOs:**

Nebechi Ugwuozor, Executive Director, POVINAA  
Chris Ugwu, Executive Director, NSRIP  
Ifeyinwa Ofong, Executive Director, WIDE/WWN

**Private Sector:**

Anny Chigbo, Executive Director Projekt Klinit  
PO Nduka, Palisco Nigeria Ltd  
Chidi B. Ohia, Cibron Services  
Ikechukwu Nnaji, Gonac Nigeria  
Mrs Nwagbara, Essychin Int.  
Ikchukwu Ngene, Jupon Ventures Nigeria  
Sunday John, Honest John Enterprise Nigeria

**Residents of New Haven Pilot Area, including:**

Hon (Mrs) Grace Eneh, Enugu North Local Govt  
Mrs Ibik Patty Nkem

## Annex 2

### List of Documentation Reviewed

1. Solid Waste Management Improvement Pilot Project In Enugu City – Phase 1	Lynne Barratt & Innocent Diyoke Feb. 03
2. Solid Waste Management 2	Lynne Barratt March 03
3. Solid Waste Management Improvement Phase 1 – Enugu (2 <sup>nd</sup> Input),	Lynne Barratt & Innocent Diyoke. Apr. 03
4. Solid Waste Management Improvement In Enugu – Phase 3	Lynne Barratt & Innocent Diyoke. Jun. 03
5. Information On The Solid Waste Situation In Nigeria – A Case Study Of Benue And Enugu States	Rufus Sha'ato & Patrick C. Ikor Jun. 03
6. Technical Support and Supervision of New Haven Pilot Site in Enugu	Innocent Diyoke Oct. 2003
7. Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement pilots phase 2 FCT	Lynne Barratt Jan 04
8. Revenue and expenditure Tracking for Enugu State Environmental Protection Agency	Patrick Okonji & Chinedu Eze Jan. 04
9. Consultancy in Service Delivery Improvement pilots Enugu	Lynne Barratt Feb. 04
10. Solid Waste Management in Enugu	Innocent Diyoke Mar. 04
11. Consultancy on Re-cycling and Reuse of Solid Waste in Enugu State	James C. Nwafor Apr. 04
12. Benue Integrated Solid Waste Management Project; Review of Project Design and Key Issues	Lynne Barratt & Rufus Sha'Ato June 04
13. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu	Lynne Barratt & Greg Anyaegbudike June 04
14. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu	Lynne Barratt & Greg Anyaegbudike Oct. 04
15. Solid Waste Management Training: PSP Programme in Enugu	Kenneth Westlake Nov. 04
16. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu	Lynne Barratt & Greg Ayanegbunike Dec. 04
17. Solid Waste Management Improvement Training Programme in Enugu	Kenneth Westlake Dec. 04
18. Lesson Learning Input in Ekiti	Steve Bertram & Yemi Adeleye Dec. 04
19. Report on Monitoring and Evaluating SLGP 2005-6	Juliet Pierce Feb. 05
20. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu	Lynne Barratt & Greg Anyaegbudike Jan 05
21. Solid Waste Management Improvement in Enugu	Kenneth Westlake April 2005



**Annex 3**

**Summary of Costs to April 2005**

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	£
Consultancy	130,940
Front Wheel Loader purchase	70,553
Capital (including plant hire)	202,050
Sundry expenses	22,893
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>426,436</b>

## Annex 4

### Template for M&E Applied to the Project

Subject of the review	<i>Solid Waste Management</i>
Date of the review	23 May – 2 June 2005
Purpose of theme or IBP	Service delivery improvement in solid waste management services in Enugu town
Summarise the main outputs achieved below	
<p><u>Areas of greatest achievement:</u></p> <p>a) Tackling issues of public expenditure management, human resource management, image management and revenue generation</p> <p>b) Establishing private sector partnerships with government</p> <p><u>Areas of some achievement:</u></p> <p>c) Involving civil society in awareness raising and monitoring service delivery</p> <p>d) Involving different tiers of government in service delivery and improving coordination between them</p> <p>e) Drawing the links between environmental management and public health</p> <p><u>Achievement yet to be seen:</u></p> <p>f) Improving service delivery by providing a cleaner and healthier environment</p>	
How relevant was this theme or IBP to Nigerian stakeholders, DFID and SLGP's policies and needs?	<p>In terms of its importance to Enugu State Government, the theme was relevant; an area which clearly needed reform and about which there was no vested political interest preventing it from happening. The idea came from ESRT and had the backing of the Governor throughout. In terms of the general public, it was relevant, but there was no significant 'groundswell' of opinion pushing for change in this area.</p> <p>The real importance of the theme was not related to the management of solid waste, but rather the example of reforming a parastatal to deliver services more effectively. As an example of the possibilities of change through public sector reform, the project is highly relevant both to Enugu and to SLGP and DFID. The IBP has been espoused as a key mechanism to achieve change, and this project provides a good example of how to achieve aspects of change generic to any government service.</p>
How effective was the theme or project overall?	Effectiveness has been high in relation to setting standards for contractual and procurement procedures, setting examples in relation to human resource management issues, and providing a template for privatisation of services. It has been mixed in relation to interaction with civil society, with tiers of government, and with establishing links between environmental management and public health, and it is yet to be shown whether all of the component activities are really going to impact on improved service delivery.

<p>How efficient in terms of the resources and time allocated?</p>	<p>The project has been expensive in terms of capital inputs (64% of the budget to date) some of which has not been efficient spending, particularly the purchase of the pay loader. The pilot was a costly failure, which though yielding lessons, could potentially have been avoided if more scoping had been done. Further, a greater allocation of resources to the ‘softer’ side of inputs may have paid dividends particularly in relation to engaging with civil society.</p> <p>However, much has been achieved in a limited period of time on the institutional reform side, with good use of consultancy time in this respect.</p> <p>Therefore, in terms of value for money the project has achieved a good deal in terms of reform. The degree of wastage and inefficient spend can be justified by the impact of spend upon perceived commitment and engagement.</p>
<p>What impact has the theme or IBP had in terms of intended, unintended, positive and negative impacts?</p>	<p>Impact on service delivery is as yet difficult to determine; it is too soon to judge.</p> <p>Impact of the project on governance is emerging, with signs that lessons have been learnt, examples set which are replicable across sectors and it is clear that many senior government officials are watching ESWAMA with interest.</p>
<p>How sustainable has the overall intervention proved to be?</p>	<p>The reform activity needs further external support to ensure its sustainability. Signs that activity has gone far enough to be embedded in the system are apparent, but need more nurturing to ensure that the gains are not reversed, or too dependent on particular individuals.</p>
<p>What lessons have been learned to inform future programme design in this area?</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) That high level political support is essential to a project such as this which inevitably touches on core governance issues before long</li> <li>b) That the technical feasibility of an issue needs to be carefully considered before embarking on a project of this nature, particularly in the light of the political pressure that high level support will inevitably bring to ‘show results’</li> <li>c) That in terms of improving services from inefficient and bloated government agencies a ‘quick win’ is a naïve hope: these processes take time and reveal why reform has not been achieved before now</li> <li>d) The pilot provided the entry to serious institutional reform issues, and the public nature of the SLGP and Governor’s commitment to the pilot gave the project the required ‘traction’ to engage with reform</li> <li>e) That legislative reform can provide the basis for tackling ongoing institutional issues</li> <li>f) That taking risks in relation to human resource management both in terms of retrenchment and recruiting can pay significant dividends when done with due process to set an example for change with other government agencies</li> <li>g) That institutional reform is multi-faceted and requires tackling a whole series of issues to achieve real change</li> </ul>	



**Slgp**

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- h) That reform in one part of government highlights weaknesses in other parts of the system which then need to be considered for support in their own right
- i) That the lack of emphasis on social and behavioural issues in relation to the project has been a constraint to its success and is an ongoing area of need
- j) That support for a privatisation model needs to be managed carefully with consistent input into monitoring its progress, as well as listening to emerging problems
- k) That SLGP, or any other external agent, needs to consider just how time and resource intensive these processes are, requiring a wide range of skills and a consistency of oversight, as well as a longevity of commitment